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1. Introduction 
 
In 1973 Economica devoted its February issue to celebrating Sir John Hicks. On that occasion, 
Hicks’s famous monograph Value and Capital (1939) was hailed as “the book that transformed 
economic theory” (p. 1). Nowadays Value and Capital (henceforth VC) is viewed as the starting 
point of the so-called neo-Walrasian research programme. From at least the early 1960s Hicks 
himself endorsed that qualification and recognized his own Walrasian affiliation at the time when 
he was writing VC (1960, p. 250, fn. 5; 1976, pp. 290, 296; 1983b, p. 85). 
Yet, on re-reading VC, such parentage does not stand out so clearly. VC is subdivided into four 
parts, the first two devoted to ‘statics’ and the last two to ‘dynamics’. One should expect that, at 
least in the ‘static’ parts of VC, Walras should be at the centre of the stage; but this is not really so. 
It is true that, soon after the beginning of Part II – General Equilibrium, Hicks (1939, p. 61) 
declares: “I shall follow Walrasian methods in considerable parts of this book”. Yet, perusing the 
one hundred and ten pages of the ‘static’ parts, one immediately realizes that the pride of place goes 
to Marshall and Pareto; Walras is hardly mentioned, except when it is strictly necessary. And even 
when his name is mentioned, as it happens at the pages 57-61, where Hicks evokes the allegedly 
Walrasian equation-counting method for ‘proving’ equilibrium existence and alludes to Walras’ 
Law, the reference is far from favourable: at p. 61, in particular, the “Walrasian system” is blamed 
for its “sterility”, which is ascribed to the fact that “Walras did not go on to work out the laws of 
change for his system of General Equilibrium.” 
If one then moves to the ‘dynamic’ parts of VC, the situation is understandably even worse. In 
the two fundamental chapters introducing Part III, respectively called “The Method of Analysis” 
and “Equilibrium and Disequilibrium”, there is room for Böhm-Bawerk, J.B. Clark, Cassel, Keynes, 
Knight, Pigou, and Wicksell, but not for Walras or any other economist of the “Lausanne School” 
(this being the name occasionally used by Hicks in those years to designate Walras, Pareto and their 
followers). Walras is only mentioned once, together with Edgeworth, in the two-page long Note to 
Chapter IX on “The Formation of Prices” (1939, pp. 127-9), which is almost entirely devoted to 
Marshall’s theory of barter and temporary equilibrium. 
Further, it is at least curious that the VC model, nowadays universally regarded as the point of 
departure of the neo-Walrasian programme, should have been called with a name, ‘temporary 
equilibrium model’, that is directly drawn from Marshall’s, rather than Walras’s, conceptual system. 
As a matter of fact, the controversial relationship between Hicks and the Walrasian approach is 
not only exemplified by some passages to be found in VC, but is also instanced by the contents of 
almost all of Hicks’s writings in the 1930s. For instance, in his 1933 paper in German, now re-
published in English translation as (1980b), not only does Hicks criticize Pareto for his ambiguity 
about the equilibrium notion and his lack of any proper theory of capital, but he also attacks Walras 
for his confusion about the meaning of equilibrium, a confusion that is regarded as even more 
serious than Pareto’s, and, as a consequence, for his mistaken theories of capital and money (1980b, 
pp. 29, and 33, fn. 13). Strong criticisms are raised against Walras’s conception of equilibrium and 
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his theory of capital also in Hicks’s 1934 Econometrica article specifically devoted to Walras; but 
what is perhaps even more striking in this paper is the way-out suggested by Hicks in order to 
escape from the fallacies beleaguering Walras’s theory: for he recommends a stationary 
interpretation of both the Walrasian equilibrium notion and Walras’s theory of capital. Quite 
paradoxically, however, a few months later Hicks abandons the stationary equilibrium interpretation 
(1935b, pp. 68) and reproaches Pareto, among others, for allegedly interpreting the equilibrium 
concept in a stationary sense (1936a, p. 85). 
The intricate relationship between Hicks and the “Lausanne School” in the 1930s, culminating 
in the ambiguous connotations of VC, has been indirectly acknowledged by Hicks himself, who has 
come back over and over again to those years, on the one hand to offer an inside reconstruction of 
his own intellectual history during that decade (1963, 1973, 1979a, 1980a, 1981b, 1982b, 1982c, 
1982d, 1983b), and, on the other, to reinterpret, qualify, amend, and even disown and repudiate the 
VC model and the underlying method of analysis (1956, 1965, 1976, 1985). 
The aim of this paper is to clarify the theoretical reasons behind the winding path followed by 
Hicks over the 1930s, especially as far as the Walrasian conception of equilibrium and equilibration 
is concerned: in fact, while Hicks’s haziness about his theoretical affiliation in both VC and his later 
writings has been thoroughly investigated in the literature (see, in particular, De Vroey (1999b), 
(2006)), the roots of such ambiguity in his previous intellectual history have still to be discussed in 
detail. In Sections 2 and 3 we shall examine Hicks’s ideas on the Walrasian approach and related 
matters in the early 1930s, focusing especially on Hicks’s 1933 paper in German and his 1934 
article on Walras: Section 2 will chiefly deal with the exchange model, while Section 3 will be 
mainly devoted to the models with production and capital formation. Section 4 will summarize the 
questions that are left open by the 1934 article. In Section 5 we shall analyse the evolution of 
Hicks’s thought on Walrasian equilibrium and equilibration during the years of the gestation of VC, 
focusing especially on Hicks’s two important 1935 papers (1935a and 1935b) and on his two 
reviews of Keynes’s General Theory (1936b and 1937a). Section 6 will discuss the VC temporary 
equilibrium model. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Hicks on Walrasian equilibrium and equilibration (1930-1934): exchange 
 
Hicks’s reflections on equilibrium date from his first theoretical paper on Edgeworth and 
Marshall (1930) and are central to all his other works of the early 1930s: the paper on uncertainty 
and profit (1931), the book on the theory of wages (1932), the paper on equilibrium and the cycle 
(1933), as well as the joint paper with Allen on consumer and demand theory (Hicks and Allen, 
1934a and 1934b). Yet, since the focus of the present paper is on Walrasian equilibrium, it is 
convenient to start from the 1934 article on Léon Walras (called the ‘Walras’ paper in the 
following), where Hicks systematically confronts our main issue, going back to the previous 
writings when necessary. 
The ‘Walras’ paper was commissioned to Hicks by the editors of Econometrica on the occasion 
of Walras’s centenary and was meant to provide a general presentation of that author’s ideas to the 
benefit of the readers of that journal. According to Hicks’s later opinion, he did not do a good job, 
for in the paper “there [was] too much about the relation of Walras to Marshall, who naturally 
bulked large in the circles in which [Hicks] was moving” (1983b, p. 85). As a matter of fact, the 
place of Marshall in the paper is absolutely out of proportion, as can be seen, e.g., from the 
following passage: 
 
Indeed, the modern reader of Walras’ Eléments d’Economie Politique Pure is struck by its 
affinity, not with the work of Jevons or Menger, but with that of Marshall. For a quite 
considerable part of the way Walras and Marshall go together; and when they separate, it is 
a difference of interest, rather than of technique, that divides them. (Hicks 1934, p. 338). 
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In the 1980s Hicks ascribed his juvenile overvaluation of the affinities between Walras and 
Marshall to the influence of the scientific environment from which he was then surrounded. This is 
certainly true, but it is not all the truth: for, in the whole of the ‘Walras’ paper, one perceives a 
systematic tendency on the part of Hicks to blur the differences between Walras and Marshall, a 
tendency that will persist over the years and will have momentous effects in VC, as will be seen in 
Section 6 below. In 1934, the most important instance of such tendency can be found in a passage 
where Hicks maintains that both Walras and Marshall, starting from the same “conception of 
perfect competition”, traceable to “Cournot’s analysis [of] Unlimited Competition”, are able to 
build a theory of individual competitive behaviour that is at the basis of their “theory of exchange 
value generally”: 
 
In the hands of Walras, this conception of perfect competition was converted into a special 
technique of using prices as economic parameters. Although this technique was used by 
Marshall as well, its very consistent employment is highly characteristic of Walras’s work. 
(Hicks 1934, pp. 339-40) 
 
Yet Marshall, unlike Walras, never assumed price-taking behaviour and never used “prices as 
economic parameters”1. Many years later, Hicks will recognise his mistake (Hicks 1983a, p. 88, fn. 
7). In the 1930s, however, the blurring of the differences between the two economists was there to 
stay and to play an important role in Hicks’s story. 
According to Hicks, it is with the determination of the equilibrium conditions in the multiple 
exchange problem that, “for the first time, we have a characteristically Walrasian doctrine. What is 
it worth?” (1934, p. 341) Hicks’s answer runs as follows: 
 
The types of equations used by Walras in determining exchange equilibrium are two; those 
which express the dependence of the amounts demanded and supplied by particular 
individuals on the system of market prices, and those which express the equality of demand 
and supply in particular markets. These two classes stand on very different footings. So far 
as the first class is concerned, they have become the essential foundation for the whole 
branch of economics to which they refer. [...] 
The second class, which expresses the equation of supply and demand in the different 
markets [...] has proved much more open to criticism. For it is on this class that the meaning 
of Walras’ system of general equilibrium depends, and by far the most important divergence 
between Walras and Marshall turns on this point. (Hicks 1934, p. 341) 
 
What Hicks has in mind in the last part of the last sentence may appear mysterious at first sight. 
But the meaning is clarified by the content of a footnote appended to the quotation, where the reader 
is referred to “Edgeworth’s review of Walras in Nature (1889) and his controversy with 
Bortkiewicz in the Revue d’Economie Politique (1890-91). Also his comment in Papers, II, 311.”  
What the references in this footnote make clear is that the issue Hicks is concerned with is that 
of the establishment of equilibrium, that is, of the process by which an equilibrium state is arrived at 
in the exchange model: for the chief objection raised by Edgeworth against Walras’s theory in his 
1889 review of the second edition of the Eléments, an objection reiterated with almost identical 
words thirty six years later in the passage of Edgeworth’s Papers (1925b) referred to by Hicks, 
concerns precisely Walras’s view of the equilibration process, as expressed by his celebrated 
tâtonnement construct. That construct also represents the main bone of contention in the 1890-91 
controversy between Bortkiewicz (1890), acting as Walras’s spokesman in this contingency, and 
Edgeworth himself (1891a)2. 
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After recalling the Walrasian rule of price adjustment underlying tâtonnement in exchange (“if 
demands and supplies are not equal, prices will be changed until equilibrium is reached”), Hicks 
continues as follows: 
 
What, however, Walras does not make really clear is whether any exchanges do or do not 
actually take place at the prices originally proposed, when those prices are not equilibrium 
prices. If there is no actual exchange until the equilibrium prices are reached by bidding, 
then Walras’ argument is beyond reproach on the score of logical consistency, though it may 
be called unrealistic. (The market then proceeds under Edgeworth’s principle of 
“recontract”, or provisional contract.) But if such exchanges do take place, then, in general, 
the final equilibrium prices will be affected by them. (Hicks 1934, p. 342) 
 
To this passage a long footnote is appended, where Hicks quotes a well-known passage 
belonging to Lesson 5 of the Eléments, right at the beginning of the part on exchange, where Walras 
expresses his view that the markets which are best organized from the competitive standpoint are 
those in which transactions are centralized and prices are openly announced by professional agents 
(Walras 1988, p. 703). This passage, however, has nothing to do with Hicks’s dilemma and can 
consequently do nothing to dispel his doubts. Hence, not surprisingly, the footnote ends with the 
sentence: “This remains ambiguous” (1934, p. 342, f. 11). 
Yet, all, or at least most, of Walras’s ambiguities censured by Hicks would have been removed 
if the latter, instead of quoting the irrelevant passage on organised markets, had quoted another 
famous passage, immediately following the one referred to by Hicks, where Walras explicitly 
solves the dilemma in favour of the first alternative: for, in the context of a specific example 
concerning the market for a particular kind of securities (perpetuities)  traded on the Paris Stock 
Exchange, he makes an explicit assumption to the effect that no trade is allowed to take place 
(“Théoriquement, l’échange doit être suspendu” or “Suspension de l’échange”) up until equilibrium 
is reached (1988, p. 89, 2-4). 
One can hardly believe that this passage may have escaped Hicks’s attention4. It is true that the 
few words expressing the ‘no trade out of equilibrium assumption’ were not present in the first 
edition of the Eléments and were inserted only in the second. But, since Hicks was then using the 4th 
edition, as he himself informs us (1976, p. 296, fn. 16), his neglect of the ‘no trade out of 
equilibrium assumption’ cannot be explained with its belated introduction. A more likely 
explanation is that Hicks was led to “forget” the few clarifying words added by Walras in the 
second edition of the Eléments because of his desire to stress the general dilemma underlying any 
equilibration process of the Walrasian type, as well as, perhaps, Walras’s own ambiguities in this 
respect. 
For Walras had certainly been very undecided and unclear about the interpretation of his 
tâtonnement: as far as the exchange model is concerned, Walras’s original view had probably been 
a very realistic one, allowing transactions to take place out of equilibrium; as far as the models with 
production are concerned (i.e., the exchange and production model and the model with capital 
formation), from the very beginning Walras had envisaged a tâtonnement process where observable 
exchange and production activities are allowed to take place out of equilibrium5. While postponing 
                                                 
3 Since 1988 a comparative edition of Walras’s Eléments is available, where the texts of the various editions of the 
Eléments (1st 1874-77, 2nd 1889, 3rd 1896, and 4th 1900) are collated and compared. When quoting from or referring to 
the Eléments, we shall use the comparative 1988 edition. All references will have the following form: (Walras 1988, 
page number(s), edition number(s) in bold). When no edition number is specified, as in the reference above, this must 
be taken to mean that the text remained unchanged over all the editions. 
4 In effect, it did not escape the attention of Kaldor, who, at about the same time as Hicks, put forward an interpretation 
of Walras’s tâtonnement in exchange where due account is paid to the ‘no trade out of equilibrium assumption’ (Kaldor 
1934, p. 126). 
5 See Donzelli (2007). 
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an examination of the models with production to the next Section, we discuss now the issues related 
with the equilibration process in the exchange model. 
As is well-known, in 1883 Bertrand criticised a version of the exchange model contained in the 
second edition, then recently published, of Walras’s Théorie de la richesse sociale (Walras 1993). 
Bertrand’s contention was that, owing to the actual carrying out of observable transactions during 
the equilibration process (this being Bertrand’s interpretation of tâtonnement in exchange), the data 
of the economy would change during the process, so that no prediction could be made of the 
equilibrium eventually reached and the model would turn out to be indeterminate. 
Walras reacted to this attack at first in 1885, by explicitly introducing a ‘no trade out of 
equilibrium assumption’ in an obscure paper on an entirely different subject (Walras 1885, p. 312, 
fn. 1), and then in 1889, by inserting the above mentioned words in the relevant passage of the 
second edition of the Eléments. Yet, apart from that insertion, the whole structure of Walras’s 
reasoning, as far as the exchange model is concerned, remained unaffected. So that in 1934 Hicks, 
though formally incorrect, had after all some substantive justification in signalling the existence of a 
problem that Walras had simply swept under the carpet with his ‘no trade out of equilibrium 
assumption’6. 
After describing the dilemma confronting Walras as far as the equilibration issue is concerned, 
in his ‘Walras’ paper Hicks went on to explain how Marshall had tried to face the same issue from a 
different perspective: 
 
Marshall’s way out of this dilemma was to concentrate on a particular market, where he 
could show that if the marginal utility of one of the commodities exchanged could be treated 
as constant, then the final rate of interchange would be independent of the path followed to 
reach it. But this solution – which is, after all, only a very particular solution – is usually not 
available in the case of General Equilibrium. (Hicks 1934, pp. 342-3) 
 
Hicks meant here to refer to Marshall’s theory of barter and its generalisation to the theory of 
market or temporary equilibrium, respectively discussed in Appendix F. Barter and Chapter 2, Book 
5 of Marshall’s Principles of Economics (1961a, pp. 791-3, 331-6). Marshall’s theory of barter had 
also been the subject of a controversy between Edgeworth, (1891b) and (1891c), and Berry (1891), 
acting in this contingency as Marshall’s spokesman7. In 1934 Hicks was well aware of this debate, 
for it had been at the centre of his 1930 paper on the indeterminateness of barter. Moreover, in his 
article with Allen on the theory of demand (Hicks and Allen, 1934a and 1934b), Hicks had also 
arrived at restating Marshall’s assumption of a constant marginal utility of either one of the 
commodities exchanged (in the “theory of barter”) or money (in what Marshall’s calls the “theory 
of buying and selling”, i.e., the usual Marshallian theory of a “particular market” where an ordinary 
commodity is traded for money) in terms of the newly worked out conceptual apparatus, based on 
marginal rates of substitution and income elasticities of demand: specifically, he had been able to 
show that the Marshallian property of a constant marginal utility of either one of the traded 
commodities or money is equivalent, in the new terminology, to the property of a zero income-
                                                 
6 It is worth noting that Keynes, to whom Hicks had sent a copy of the ‘Walras’ paper, wrote back to Hicks that, in his 
opinion, Walras had certainly had in mind the first alternative: Keynes’s conjecture was not based on a superior 
knowledge of Walras’s writings, but on his empirical acquaintance with the method followed at the Paris Stock 
Exchange for arriving at equilibrium prices, a method coinciding with Hicks’s first alternative, and on his persuasion 
that Walras couldn’t but be aware of what was going on at the Paris Stock Exchange (Hicks 1976, p. 296, fn. 16). Even 
if we now know that Walras’s reason for explicitly introducing the ‘no trade out of equilibrium assumption’ was 
theoretical, rather than empirical, we must also add that Keynes was right in his conjecture: for Walras had indeed been 
aware of the rules governing the price adjustment process at the Paris stock Exchange, including the ‘no trade out of 
equilibrium’ rule, as he had made clear in an applied paper published in 1880 (Walras 1880, pp. 408, 432). Hicks will 
duly take account of Keynes’s remark in VC, changing his interpretation of Walras’s passage quoted in the ‘Walras’ 
paper accordingly (Hicks 1939, p. 128, fn. 1). 
7 See also Marshall (1961b, pp. 791-8). 
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elasticity of demand (a zero income-effect) for either the other commodity involved in the barter or 
the commodity proper exchanged against money (Hicks and Allen 1934a, pp. 64-5). 
In the passage from the ‘Walras’ paper quoted above Hicks appears to rule out the possibility of 
extending Marshall’s special solution of the equilibration issue from a “particular market” to the 
multiple-exchange case characteristic of “General Equilibrium”. Yet, the results reached just a few 
months before in the Hicks and Allen paper had apparently been more favourable to such extension: 
for, “if the marginal utility of one commodity out of many is constant, the income-elasticities of all 
the rest will be zero”8; and this would seem to suggest that Marshall’s solution is not necessarily 
confined to his partial equilibrium framework. However, since the possibility of extending 
Marshall’s solution to a “General Equilibrium” multi-commodity context will play a paramount role 
in Hicks’s construction of his VC temporary equilibrium model, we put provisionally aside this 
issue, postponing its discussion to Section 6 below. 
Up to this point in the ‘Walras’ paper, in examining the equilibration issue with exclusive 
reference to the exchange model, Hicks had explored three alternative ‘solutions’, all of which had 
apparently turned out to be unsatisfactory. The first alternative, according to which the equilibration 
process is a purely virtual process in ‘logical’ time with no observable counterpart, is “logically 
consistent”, but “unrealistic”; this ‘solution’ would be exemplified by either Edgeworth’s 
recontracting process, if interpreted as a purely mentalistic process, as suggested by Hicks in the 
quoted passage, or Walras’s tâtonnement process in exchange, under the ‘no trade out of 
equilibrium assumption’ (but, as we have seen, Hicks was apparently unaware of its explicit 
adoption by Walras); since, in this case, the purely mentalistic equilibration process would not 
require any instant of ‘real’ time (i.e., of the time set over which the economy is supposed to 
evolve) to carry its effects through, the equilibrium eventually arrived at may be regarded as 
‘instantaneously’ reached at that instant of ‘real’ time to which the data characterising the economy, 
hence the equilibrium,  are associated. The second alternative, according to which the equilibration 
process is an observable process in ‘real’ time with actual trades out of equilibrium, is “realistic”, 
but either logically inconsistent, if combined with the assumption that the equilibration process 
should neither change the data of the economy nor affect the equilibrium eventually arrived at, or, 
as supposed by Hicks, necessarily producing an undetermined outcome; this ‘solution’ would be 
instanced by Walras’s tâtonnement process, if it lacked the ‘no trade out of equilibrium 
assumption’, as surmised  by, e.g., Bertrand (1883). Finally, the third alternative, according to 
which the equilibration process is an observable process in ‘real’ time, with actual trades taking 
place under Marshall’s assumption of a constant marginal utility of either a money-like commodity 
or money proper, is not only “realistic”, but also such that the final rate of exchange, in a two-
commodity barter economy, or the final money price, in a Marshallian “particular market”, would 
be left unaffected by the trading process; yet the possibility of extending Marshall’s solution to a 
multi-commodity economy is doubtful. 
In view of this, it is certainly not surprising that Hicks, in concluding his preliminary review of 
the alternatives put forward by the economists of the “Lausanne School” (or, for that matter, by 
Marshall himself) in order to solve the equilibration problem in a multi-commodity exchange 
model, should express the following negative opinion:  
 
Neither Walras nor Pareto faced up to this difficulty; when we do so, it is impossible to 
avoid the conclusion that the “Lausanne equations” are of rather less significance then they 
imagined. (Hicks 1934, pp. 343) 
 
But is it really true, as Hicks would let us believe, that neither Walras nor Pareto “faced up to 
the difficulties” inherent in the analysis of the equilibration process in a general equilibrium 
framework? 
                                                 
8 Hicks and Allen (1934a, p. 18; italics added). See also the footnote appended to the quoted sentence. 
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3. Hicks on Walrasian equilibrium and equilibration (1930-1934): production and capital 
 
As already recalled, Walras had explicitly introduced the ‘no trade out of equilibrium 
assumption’ in the mid-1880s to get rid of the indeterminacy problem in the exchange model, but he 
had not at the same time changed the assumptions concerning the nature of the tâtonnement in his 
models with production. As a result, in the second and third editions of the Eléments, Walras had 
kept to the assumption, already made in the first one, that in the models with production the 
quantity adjustment process is a process in ‘real’ time, involving exchange and production activities 
aimed at transforming capital services into products. The process repeats itself over a sequence of 
rounds or periods, under unchanging technical conditions (summarised by a single-output, fixed-
coefficients technology) and a constant provision of capital services; the process brings about a 
progressive adjustment, in accordance with the Walrasian rule of quantity adjustment which 
stipulates that the change in each industry’s output be a sign-preserving function of that industry’s 
profits. The process goes on until the production equilibrium conditions (zero profits in all 
industries) are eventually satisfied. 
Up to this point, Walras’s analysis of the production process in the second and third editions of 
the Eléments is common to his two equilibrium models with production. From this point onwards, 
however, one must carefully distinguish between the exchange and production model, on the one 
hand, and the model with capital formation, on the other: for in the first model production consists 
in transforming capital services (by definition non durables) into non-durable consumer goods; in 
the second, instead, the outcome of the production process consists not only in consumer goods, but 
also in capital goods proper (by definition durables). Hence, while in the exchange and production 
model there are only flow-commodities (i.e., services and non-durable consumer goods), in the 
model with capital formation stocks (i.e., capital goods proper) are present too. Therefore, the 
economy described by the exchange and production model is a pure-flow economy; that described 
by the capital formation model is an economy where both flows and stocks are jointly considered. 
In a pure-flow economy there are no linkages between time periods: in each period the data are 
purely exogenous, since no stocks can possibly be carried over from the past and no intertemporal 
activities can possibly be performed by the agents participating in the economy. Hence, in this case, 
the invariance of the data over ‘real’ time can be legitimately assumed. As a consequence, the 
equilibrium eventually arrived at has the nature of a stationary equilibrium, identically repeating 
itself over time under unchanging conditions. 
When stocks are present, however, the data characterizing the economy in each period are not 
longer purely exogenous: for at least part of the data (namely, the produced capital goods) are the 
result of the production activities carried out in the past. No assumption of data invariance in ‘real’ 
time can be legitimately made in this case. Hence, the capital formation model of the second and 
third editions of the Eléments necessarily is an inconsistent model, for it employs a stationary 
equilibrium concept which runs foul of the endogenous source of change in the data represented by 
the production of capital goods. 
In the end, one can conclude that in the second and third editions of the Eléments Walras ends 
up by finding himself in a blind alley. As a matter of fact, each one of the three formalised 
equilibrium models discussed in those two editions turns out to be characterised by a different 
equilibrium notion: the exchange model is associated with an instantaneous equilibrium concept, 
the exchange and production model with a consistent stationary equilibrium concept, and finally the 
capital formation model with an inconsistent stationary equilibrium concept. 
To escape this predicament, in the fourth edition of the Eléments Walras eventually resolved to 
make an assumption, called “hypothèse des bons”, which rules out all observable trade and 
production activities during the equilibration process: the agents are supposed just to exchange 
“bons”, without carrying out any actual action. In this way the tâtonnement processes at work in all 
the three models are converted into purely virtual processes, taking place in ‘logical’ time and 
driving the economy towards an overall instantaneous equilibrium. 
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Under this assumption, the time structure of the analysis can be specified as follows: 
 
Au moyen de l’hypothèse des bons, on peut distinguer nettement, surtout si on les suppose 
successives, les trois phases suivantes : 
1° La phase des tâtonnements préliminaires en vue de l’établissement de l’équilibre en 
principe ;  
2° La phase statique de l’établissement effective ab ovo de l’équilibre […] pendant la 
période de temps considérée, aux conditions convenues, sans changements dans les données 
du problème ; 
3° Une phase dynamique de trouble continuel de l’équilibre par des changements dans ces 
données et de rétablissement continuel de l’équilibre ainsi troublé. 
En conséquence de ces définitions, il doit être bien entendu que les capitaux neufs […] qui 
seront livrés pendant la seconde phase […] ne fonctionneront que dans la troisième phase, 
constituant ainsi un premier changement dans les données du problème. (Walras, 1988, pp. 
447, 449, 4) 
 
As can be seen, the economy envisaged by Walras is, in modern language, a sequential 
economy, where markets open at specified instants of ‘real’ time. Such instants are distributed over 
time at intervals (“périodes”) of arbitrary length, which for simplicity can be taken to be always the 
same. At each specified instant an equilibrium is instantaneously reached by means of a purely 
virtual tâtonnement process in ‘logical’ time (“tâtonnements préliminaires”). The equilibrium 
contracts made at the initial instant of each period are actually carried out during the period (“phase 
statique”), without any change in the data. The data can only change, for both exogenous and 
endogenous reasons, at the timeless juncture between any two periods, i.e., at the initial instant of 
the second one (“phase dynamique”). The endogenous source of change in the data specifically 
mentioned by Walras consists in the production of new capital goods proper. 
In the light of the above definitions and assumptions, the evolution of the economy can be 
described (or explained) by means of a chronologically ordered sequence of instantaneous 
equilibria, each corresponding to the data prevailing at the instant to which the equilibrium is 
associated. Walras (1988, p. 447, 4) designates this descriptive (or explanatory) procedure by the 
expression “équilibre variable ou mobile”. No assumption of stationarity of either the data or the 
sequence of instantaneous equilibria is necessary or possible in this theoretical framework; and, in 
effect, no such assumption is made by Walras. Moreover, no special limitation as to the nature of 
the commodities that can be traded or produced in the economy is required in this context: in 
particular, both stocks and flows can be the object of economic activity. 
Pareto had reached very similar conclusions even before Walras. As a matter of fact, in his 
Cours d’économie politique (1896-97) Pareto had very closely followed in Walras’s steps, 
structuring his theoretical system by means of the same tripartite classification of nested models 
(exchange, exchange and production, capital formation) as that adopted by Walras; moreover, to 
each one of the three models Pareto had associated a specific tâtonnement process along the lines 
suggested by his predecessor. Yet, already in 1896 he had arrived at interpreting the tâtonnement 
construct and the equilibrium concept in a way that would be fully endorsed by Walras only in 
1900, when he would finally adopt the “hypothèse des bons” in the fourth edition of the Eléments. 
Specifically, Pareto had suggested subdividing the continuous flow of time into discrete periods, 
thereby interpreting time variable as a discontinuous variable. To the initial instant of each period a 
“static” equilibrium could then be associated. The evolution of the economy over time could then be 
described, as in Walras (1900), by means of a chronologically ordered sequence of such equilibria. 
This method of analysis had been called by Pareto the “method of successive equilibria” (Pareto 
1897, p. 10). 
In his later treatise on economic theory, the celebrated Manuel d’économie politique (1909), 
Pareto developed a much more abstract and general theory of individual choice and economic 
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equilibrium. In this new framework, the tâtonnement construct, as well as Walras’s distinction 
between “revenues” (flows) and “capitaux” (stocks), all disappeared from sight; any implicit or 
explicit reference to time, attained by Walras through these two devices, evaporated. Yet the 
“method of successive equilibria”, viewed as the only tool on which economic theory could rely at 
the time to describe (or explain) the evolution of the economy, survived in the Manuel as well 
(1909, pp. 147-8, 337-8). 
After this necessary digression on the evolution of Walras’s and Pareto’s views on equilibrium 
and equilibration, with special reference to the models with production and capital formation, let’s 
go back to Hicks’s ‘Walras’ paper. In the section of the paper devoted to a critical examination of 
Walras’s theory of capital, Hicks goes back to a remark already made a few pages before, 
reminding the reader of Walras’s “confusion about the exact meaning of equilibrium”: in Hicks’s 
opinion, in fact, it is precisely such a “confusion” to be blamed for Walras’s inability to 
comprehend Wicksell’s critique of Walras’s own capital theory – an issue to which we shall return 
towards the end of the present Section. It is worth noting that to the just quoted sentence Hicks 
appends a footnote, where he asserts that “the confusion [...] gets palpably worse in the later part of 
Walras’s work. See, for example, the rather pathetic passage on pp. 214-215 of the Eléments” 
(Hicks 1934, p. 346, fn. 19). But the cited passage is exactly the one, quoted in full above, where 
Walras discusses the consequences of assuming the “hypothèse des bons” on the time structure of 
the analysis, hence on the interpretation of the tâtonnement construct and the equilibrium concept. It 
is worth stressing, in this respect, that the passage hailed by Hicks (1934) as “rather pathetic” is 
contained in Lesson 28, one the very few lessons added ex novo to the forth edition (1900) of the 
Eléments. 
As we shall see in Section 6 below, the interpretation of tâtonnement and equilibrium put 
forward by Walras in the above-quoted passage will play a significant role, though only an implicit 
one, in the construction of Hicks’s VC temporary equilibrium model in 1939. Hence, it is natural to 
enquire more deeply into the reasons underlying such a severe judgement as that passed by Hicks 
on that passage in his ‘Walras’ paper. 
One reason is probably the following. The assumption newly introduced by Walras in the fourth 
edition of the Eléments, namely, the “hypothèse de bons”, magnifies those elements of artificiality  
that were already present in the tâtonnement construct from the very beginning, one such element 
being, for instance, the assumption that prices or quantities are publicly announced at random at the 
start of the process (“prix” or “quantités criés au hazard”), and subsequently changed by loosely 
specified entities according to the Walrasian rules of price or quantity adjustment. This is the reason 
leading Kaldor (1934, p. 127) to qualify “Walras’s assumption” about the tâtonnement in exchange 
as “slightly ridiculous”. 
But the main reason must be that the “hypothèse des bons”, by making explicit the assumption 
of an instantaneous equilibration process and by extending it to all models and all kinds of activities 
taking place in the economy, including production, amplifies the “unrealism” of the Walrasian 
tâtonnement construct, an “unrealism” that, having already been denounced by Hicks in connection 
with the exchange model taken by itself, is now pushed to limits that are still more difficult to stand: 
for intuition suggests that adjustment to equilibrium takes time, particularly when production is 
allowed for, while logic would seem to imply that the idea of an “instantaneous process” is nothing 
but a contradiction in terms. 
If the most important reason for Hicks’s 1934 rejection of the “hypothèse des bons” and its 
consequences is the one stated in the previous paragraph, then it becomes easier to account for 
another passage in the ‘Walras’ paper that might appear unexplainable otherwise. For, immediately 
after having concluded that, due to the inability of Walras and Pareto to “face up to [the] difficulty” 
inherent in the analysis of the equilibration process, “the ‘Lausanne equations’ are of rather less 
significance then they imagined”, Hicks suddenly appears to change his mind, opening the door to a 
possible resolution of the “difficulty”, provided that a particular interpretation of the equilibration 
process is adopted: 
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The equations of Walras are not by any means a complete solution of the problem of 
exchange; but they remain a significant step towards such a solution. For Walras’ system of 
prices will be reached, either if contracts are made provisionally or (a more important case) 
if people come on to the market on successive “days” with the same dispositions to trade, 
and the there is no carry-over of stocks (or a constant carry-over) from one day to the next. 
When it is understood in the last sense, the theory of static equilibrium of exchange takes its 
place as a step towards the development of a complete theory. (Hicks 1934, pp. 343; italics 
added) 
 
Hicks is here referring to the exchange model. This is not accidental: for, as we shall see in a 
moment, extending the argument to production raises some special problems. Yet, for the 
discussion’s sake, it is preferable to start immediately from a more general framework. 
Of the two interpretations of the equilibration process which are suggested by Hicks in the 
above passage, the first would follow from the adoption of something like the “no trade out of 
equilibrium assumption” or, more generally, the “hypothèse des bons”; in Walras’s theoretical 
system, as we have seen, it corresponds to either the conception of the tâtonnement process in the 
exchange model since the second edition of the Eléments (1889) or the conception of the so-called 
tâtonnements préliminaires in all models since the fourth (1900). The second interpretation would 
instead follow from the assumption that the same activities repeat themselves over a sequence of 
periods under unchanging exogenous conditions in a pure-flow stationary economy; in Walras’s 
theoretical system, this interpretation corresponds to the conception of the tâtonnement process in 
the exchange and production model in the second and third editions of the Eléments (1889 and 
1896). 
Hicks never explicitly recognises that the two alternative interpretations he suggests in the 
‘Walras’ paper precisely correspond to alternative conceptions of the tâtonnement process 
associated with specific equilibrium models put forward by Walras in the same or in different 
editions of the Eléments; in particular, he tends to present his second interpretation, the stationary 
one, as if it were something altogether new, unthought of before, and all the same instrumental in 
solving the long-standing “difficulty” with the equilibration process. Nor does Hicks explicitly 
acknowledge, in 1934, that his two alternative interpretations almost exactly correspond, also in the 
phrasing, to the two alternative interpretations of the recontracting process put forward by 
Edgeworth in a long series of writings: a purely mentalistic interpretation, based on the idea of 
‘provisional and revocable contracts’, which leads to a notion of instantaneous equilibrium (or, 
more generally, solution) at a moment of time; and an effective interpretation, based on the idea of 
‘enforceable and irrevocable’ one-period contracts, reiterated over a sequence of periods under 
unchanging exogenous conditions, which leads instead to a notion of stationary equilibrium (or 
solution) analogous to the stationary equilibrium of a Walrasian pure-flow economy9. 
Hicks had already adumbrated the distinction between the two alternative interpretations of the 
equilibration process, albeit somewhat confusedly, in his 1933 paper on “Equilibrium and the 
                                                 
9 The first interpretation, the better known of the two, is the prevailing one in Edgeworth (1881, pp. 16-20), (1891b, p. 
235, fn. 1), and (1891c, p. 317). Both interpretations are presented as equally valid alternatives in (1904, p. 40). The 
second interpretation is the prevailing one in (1925c, p. 313). In the ‘Walras’ paper Hicks only alludes to the first 
interpretation, when he associates “Edgeworth’s principle of ‘recontract’” with the idea of “provisional contracts” 
(1934, p. 342). But he is certainly aware of the existence of the second interpretation, which is in effect hinted at in his 
paper in German published in the previous year (Hicks, 1933, p. 30, fn. 3). To our knowledge, Berry is the first to 
openly suggest the possibility of interpreting Edgeworth’s recontracting as a stationary process in ‘real’ time, taking 
place over a sequence of periods in each of which effective one-period contracts are stipulated. Berry’s suggestion is 
made during his controversy with Edgeworth over Marshall’s theory of barter (Berry 1891, p. 552; see also Berry’s 
letter to Edgeworth, published in Marshall 1961b, pp. 793-4). On the same occasion, Berry also suggests to identify the 
unit period in the stationary sequence with the “week”; his suggestion will prove useful to Hicks, at least from a 
terminological point of view, first in 1935, when he will resume that term to designate the unit period in a sequence that 
is however non-stationary, and then a few years later in VC (see Sections 5 and 6 below). 
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cycle” (1933, pp. 29-30). There Hicks’s problem was to make more precise the “deliberately 
ambiguous definition” of equilibrium put forward by Pareto in the Manuel. In the 1933 paper, as in 
the ‘Walras’ paper of the following year, Hicks had openly expressed his preference for the second 
alternative, presupposing a “continuing” or “ongoing market” and leading to a stationary 
equilibrium notion, over the first, which leads instead to an instantaneous equilibrium notion: in 
1933 the “second interpretation of Pareto is more to the point” (p. 30), while in 1934 it represents, 
as we have seen, “a more important case”. 
Thus, in the end, in his 1933 and 1934 papers, in analysing the alternative interpretations of the 
equilibration process compatible with general equilibrium theory of either the Paretian or Walrasian 
variety, Hicks was led by his preference for the “ongoing market” interpretation over the 
instantaneous adjustment one to unearth that traditional notion of stationary equilibrium that he had 
already employed in Theory of Wages (1932, pp. 6-7) in an essentially Pigouvian partial equilibrium 
framework, with some sprinklings of Walras and Böhm-Bawerk (Hicks 1963, p. 314; 1973, p. 136). 
In a general equilibrium framework, however, a problem arises that in the partial equilibrium 
analysis of a consumer good market, or of the labour market for that matter, can be swept under the 
carpet by means of the Marshallian ceteris paribus clause: the problem of capital. 
In the 1933 paper, where Pareto’s theory is the point of departure of the analysis, Hicks had 
maintained that in the Manuel there are clues indicating that 
 
in essentials Pareto accepted the theory of capital and interest due to Böhm-Bawerk [...]. But 
this notion was never fully worked out and incorporated into his system – though the 
incorporation would not have presented any particular difficulty once it had been decided 
that equilibrium was to be interpreted in the second sense – that of the ongoing market. 
(Hicks 1933, p. 30) 
 
Therefore, having arrived at the conclusion that, for the purpose of analysing the equilibration 
process, the stationary framework of an “ongoing market” should be preferred to the alternative 
framework focusing on one single instant of ‘real’ time, Hicks apparently discovered (in 1933) that 
the stationary framework is also to be preferred for the purpose of incorporating into general 
equilibrium theory the phenomena of time-taking production and capital. Yet, if the “ongoing 
market” framework is more favourable to the development of a theory where time and capital have 
an important role to play, at the same time it imposes upon the theory a “most significant 
limitation”: for 
 
the extended equations would only [be] applicable to the conditions of a Stationary 
Equilibrium – the equilibrium of an economy in which there is no net saving. [...] The 
Lausanne equations become no more than an exact formulation of what Marshall called the 
‘famous fiction’ of the Stationary State. As such, they are not a description of reality. At 
most, they are a tool for its analysis. (Hicks 1933, p. 31)  
 
In spite of the unrealism of such an extended theory, “a precise formulation of the conditions of 
Stationary Equilibrium is a useful achievement”. Hence, in 1933 Hicks set out to provide a sketch 
of the equations determining such a Stationary Equilibrium, under the assumptions of stationary 
expectations and zero net saving: the first assumption is the most natural under stationary conditions 
and can therefore be justified under the same circumstances; the second, which finds expression in a 
“capital equation” of an aggregate type, “has often caused trouble”, but is nevertheless required by 
the structure of the extended Stationary Equilibrium model (Hicks 1933, p. 31). 
After providing this concise and altogether unsatisfactory outline of the model, however, Hicks 
did not dwell upon it. For, in 1933, he also believed that the extended Stationary Equilibrium model 
can be replaced, in its only function as a tool of analysis, by a better model: the extended general 
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equilibrium model with Perfect Foresight10. In outlining this alternative model, Hicks directly drew 
his inspiration from the writings of Knight (1921), which had already represented an important 
point of departure for Hicks’s theoretical investigations in the field of risk and uncertainty (1931), 
and especially from Hayek (1928), where a semi-formalised model of perfect foresight 
instantaneous equilibrium had already been discussed in some detail. But Hicks could also gain 
some insight from the almost contemporary works of a few Swedish economists, particularly 
Lindahl (1929) and (1930) and Myrdal (1932), who were then exploring similar paths. As Hicks 
himself tells us (1982b, p. 7), he was informed by Hayek himself in 1932 of the existence of 
Hayek’s 1928 paper in German. We also know that, when writing his 1933 paper in German, Hicks 
had not yet read the Swedish economists’ works, nor had he been able to talk with them yet; but 
their ideas were, so to speak, in the air. 
So Hicks took the idea of ‘period analysis’ from the Swedish economists’ tool-box: in a way 
very similar to the one suggested by Walras after the adoption of the “hypothèse des bons”, time is 
subdivided into periods, changes in the data take place at the junctures between periods, while 
endogenous variables are assumed constant (at their equilibrium levels) within each period. Hicks’s 
endogenous variables are prices, in the competitive tradition. Therefore, each unit period is taken to 
be “so short that the movement of prices within it can be neglected” (Hicks 1933, p. 32): this is an 
assumption that will survive up until VC. Since the stationarity assumption is dropped, the 
assumption of stationary expectations is no longer justified. Perfect Foresight can however be 
invoked to make expectations and equilibrium determinate at one and the same time: a Perfect 
Foresight equilibrium is defined as a system of current and expected prices such that, at those 
prices, all markets (current and future) clear. “Disequilibrium is the Disappointment of 
Expectations” (Hicks 1933, p. 32). 
The Perfect Foresight equilibrium model, as the Stationary Equilibrium model, is barely 
outlined: no analytical discussion, let alone a formal proof of any statement or proposition, is really 
put forward. Yet, the simple sketch provided is enough for Hicks to arrive at a very definite 
conclusion: 
  
Such a ‘dynamic equilibrium’ is obviously still far from being a description of reality. It 
does nevertheless serve as a model of a perfectly working economic system, which is much 
more usable as a standard of comparison than is the model of Stationary Equilibrium. (Hicks 
1933 p. 32; Hicks’s italics) 
 
Somewhat paradoxically, however, the sharp conclusion reached in 1933 concerning the relative 
merits of Perfect Foresight and Stationary  Equilibrium is completely reversed just one year later: in 
the ‘Walras’ paper, in fact, Perfect Foresight Equilibrium vanishes, while Stationary Equilibrium 
gains once again the centre of the scene. This preference reversal can be explained as follows. 
Let’s come back to the Section of the 1934 paper devoted to Walras’s theory of capital. Therein, 
after stressing the highly controversial character of this part of Walras’s overall theory, Hicks 
recalls one of Wicksell’s chief objections against it: since Walras’s theory “determines the rate of 
interest on the market for new capital”, it is “apparently inapplicable to stationary conditions” 
(Hicks 1934, p. 446)11. But this can be regarded as a compelling criticism only if, contrary to the 
                                                 
10 On this see also Hicks’s much later recollections in (1973, pp. 137-8), (1979a, p. 359), and (1982b, pp. 6-7). 
11 It should be noted that neither Wicksell, nor Hicks (in the ‘Walras’ paper) are able to identify the ultimate reason why 
Walras, in order to determine the rate of interest, is forced to assume that the economy under investigation be 
“progressive”, so that there can exist positive net saving to be exchanged against newly produced capital goods proper, 
whose prices can then be determined on the corresponding markets, eventually allowing the rate of interest to be 
determined. From a logical point of view, the requirement of a positive net saving, characterising a “progressive” 
economy, is as disturbing as the symmetrical requirement of a zero net saving which characterises a stationary 
economy: both requirements, in fact, impose upon the agents of the economy a particular type of saving behaviour, 
whereas the agents should be free to choose whatever sort of saving behaviour they prefer according to their 
preferences. In fact, Walras is forced to assume the “progressiveness” of the economy because of another tacit 
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conclusion reached by Hicks in the 1933 paper, compatibility with Stationary Equilibrium is viewed 
as a prerequisite for producing a good theory of capital. So, in the end, why does Hicks change his 
mind, in so short a stretch of time, about the relevance of the stationarity condition? 
There are two main reasons underlying Hicks’s change of view. The first is implicit in the 
whole trend of Hicks’s reasoning in the preceding Sections of the ‘Walras’ paper: there Hicks had 
defended the stationary interpretation of the equilibration process against the instantaneous one for 
only the first interpretation allows the theorist to account for the ‘real’ time required for the 
adjustment towards equilibrium; therefore, a good theory of capital must satisfy the stationarity 
condition too, for only a Stationary Equilibrium is empirically justifiable. The second reason, 
instead, is made explicit by Hicks at precisely this point of his argument. It has to do with the 
supposedly greater plausibility of the assumption of stationary price expectations, a supposition 
that, by itself, is enough to explain the reversal of Hicks’s preferences concerning Stationary and 
Perfect Foresight Equilibrium: 
 
Further, as Walras would have realized if it had not been for his confusion about the exact 
meaning of equilibrium, it is only in a stationary state that we can get any sensible sort of 
equilibrium so long as people expect the prices of products to remain unchanged in the 
future (as Walras tacitly assumed they do). (Hicks 1934, p. 346)12 
 
So, a good capital theory has to be consistent with the stationarity assumption. Walras’s original 
theory is not consistent with Stationary Equilibrium, and consequently cannot be a good theory. 
However, Walras’s oversight can be remedied. A “slight extension” of Walras’s original theory of 
capital, implying that the “new capital goods become not only net additions to the capital stock, but 
also replacements”, is enough to immunise the theory from Wicksell’s criticism, for in that case 
“the capital market does not disappear in the stationary state”. In view of this, Hicks can conclude 
his discussion by asserting that, “once the amendment is made, Walras’ theory of capital becomes 
as good as Wicksell’s, and better than Böhm-Bawerk’s” (Hicks 1934, pp. 346-7). 
Yet, in reaching this conclusion, Hicks unfortunately forgets that the stationarity assumption, 
legitimate in a pure-flow economy, becomes illegitimate in an economy with stocks and any other 
sort of intertemporal linkages: and capital, not only for Wicksell and Böhm-Bawerk, but also for 
Walras, certainly represents a linkage between present and future. 
 
4. Eight unsettled questions (1934) 
 
Looking back at the scientific path travelled by Hicks during the early 1930s, one cannot but be 
impressed by the great number of questions confronted, the many diverse fields explored, and the 
important results reached. However, the position taken by Hicks in those years on several 
controversial issues does not display that steadiness and conclusiveness that might be hoped for: as 
has been seen, on many crucial topics, concerning in particular equilibrium, equilibration, 
expectations, and capital, Hicks changes his mind quite often and sometimes unexpectedly, thereby 
rendering the rational reconstruction of the course travelled by him over the 1930-1934 period a 
very complicated task. In order to make the reconstruction of the subsequent half-decade easier, it is 
convenient to summarise at this point the most contentious issues remaining unsettled at the end of 
1934, also keeping in mind that that year represents a turning point in Hicks’s intellectual history. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
assumption, inadvertently introduced in the analysis, which constrains the agents’ behaviour in a different way: for he 
tacitly assumes the already existing capital goods to be untradeable. If they were tradable, there would be no need to 
assume “progressiveness” (or, for that matter, stationarity) of the economy in order to provide some equation with 
which to determine the rate of interest. 
12 A similar point, concerning the relative plausibility of the assumptions underlying Stationary and Perfect Foresight 
Equilibrium, particularly as regards expectation formation, will be made by Hicks almost thirty years after the ‘Walras’ 
paper, in the “Commentary” added to the second edition of the Theory of Wages (1963, Section III, p. 308). 
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Even if the unsolved questions are obviously interconnected, it is expedient to group them under the 
following eight headings. 
 
1. General vs. partial analysis 
As the ‘Walras’ paper clearly shows, Hicks is undecided about which of the two great traditions, 
the Walrasian and the Marshallian, should be privileged. Walrasian general equilibrium theory 
should be praised for its generality, but it runs the risk of falling into abstractness and sterility. 
The strengths of Marshallian partial equilibrium analysis are its concreteness and fruitfulness; 
its weakness lies in its specificity. Hicks implicitly asks the following question: How and to 
what extent can the two traditions be combined? 
2. Equilibration, equilibrium, and disequilibrium: Walras-Pareto vs. Marshall 
Hicks stresses the following dilemma: an observable disequilibrium theory in a general 
equilibrium framework, such as the Walrasian exchange model, leads to indeterminacy; an 
observable disequilibrium theory in a Marshallian partial equilibrium framework can be made 
consistent with a determinate outcome, at the cost of making some special assumptions. Hicks 
leaves the following question to be answered: How and to what extent the special assumptions 
employed in a partial equilibrium framework can be exported to a general equilibrium 
framework without losing their effectiveness? 
3. Equilibrium, equilibration, disequilibrium: unobservable vs. observable disequilibrium in a 
general equilibrium framework 
Hicks perceives that, in general equilibrium analysis (of the Walrasian, Paretian or 
Edgeworthian type), there exist two alternative interpretations of the equilibration process, both 
of which consistent with the premises of the theory and compatible with determinacy: the first, 
unobservable disequilibrium in ‘logical’ time, leads to an instantaneous equilibrium notion; the 
second, observable disequilibrium in ‘real’ time (restricted however to an “isolated period” 
economy, of the pure-flow or similar type), leads to a consistent stationary equilibrium notion. 
Hicks is dissatisfied with both interpretations: the first is unsatisfactory for its unrealism, the 
second for its narrowness. Yet, in 1934, he does not exactly know how to overcome the 
ascertained limitations. He only tries to broaden the set of phenomena to which stationary 
equilibrium theory can be applied (see below, points 5 and 7). The question that Hicks 
implicitly poses is the following: How can the empirical strength of the observable equilibration 
process supporting a consistent stationary equilibrium be combined with the generality and 
flexibility of instantaneous equilibrium? 
4. Instantaneous equilibrium 
Hicks dislikes this notion, due to the unrealism of the underlying equilibration process. Yet, 
perceiving its generality and potentialities, he makes use of it in special contexts, even if he 
refrains from justifying its employment on empirical grounds. The best instance of Hicks’s 
attitude towards instantaneous equilibrium is his use of the Perfect Foresight equilibrium 
concept in the 1933 paper, where it is essentially justified as a quasi-normative standard of 
reference with no claim to realism (1933, p. 32; see also 1963, p. 308). The temporary 
equilibrium concept makes just a flimsy appearance in the 1930 paper (1930, p. p. 228). Hicks 
implicitly poses the following question: How and to what extent can the normative uses of the 
instantaneous equilibrium notion be reconciled with its possible uses in positive theory? 
5. Stationary equilibrium 
Hicks likes the kind of realistic equilibration process supporting this equilibrium notion, but 
finds the pure-flow economy, to which the concept can be consistently applied, excessively 
restrictive. Therefore he repeatedly tries to employ the stationary equilibrium concept also to 
discuss issues connected with stocks and capital (in 1932, 1933, and 1934). However, Hicks’s 
attitude towards stationary equilibrium models with capital formation is winding. The questions 
that Hicks tacitly poses are: How can the stationary equilibrium notion be rescued from its 
limitations? Should it be rescued? 
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6. Expectations 
Already since 1931, when he publishes his paper on uncertainty and profits, Hicks is aware that 
in principle expectations should be represented by means of probability distributions. Yet he 
generally keeps to the more traditional representation of expectations as point expectations. 
Moreover, in line with the competitive tradition, he typically identifies expectations with price 
expectations. Stationary point price expectations are then justified when the economy is 
assumed to be stationary, and consequently the equilibrium is stationary as well; they are 
unwarranted otherwise. Correct point price expectations are the hallmark of competitive perfect 
foresight equilibrium, which should be used as a standard of reference. Hicks implicitly raises 
the following questions: How are expectations formed? Should they be regarded as exogenous 
or endogenous? 
7. Capital 
Hicks distinguishes three main theories of capital: the Austrian theory, meaning by that the 
theory of Böhm-Bawerk and Wicksell; Walras’s original theory; Walras’s amended theory. 
There are many clues suggesting that Hicks’s preferences go to the first theory, but it is also 
clear that he feels unable to formalise it and uncertain as to its soundness. The discussion of 
Walras’s theory, both in its original version and in the amended one, is wholly unsatisfactory. In 
1934 the problem of capital is viewed by Hicks as strictly connected with the problem of 
stationary equilibrium. So Hicks’s unsettled questions concerning capital are essentially the 
same as those concerning the stationary equilibrium notion. 
8. Production and demand theory 
In the early 1930s Hicks provides important contributions to the theory of production (in the 
1932 book) and fundamental ones to the theory of demand (in the 1934 paper with Allen). Such 
contributions are somewhat uncoordinated with the other breakthroughs that Hicks is 
simultaneously accomplishing in the fields listed above, as well as in others. In this respect, the 
fundamental question that Hicks ought to answer is the following: How and to what extent can 
the results already obtained in the fields of individual and market demand and production be 
merged with the results already achieved or yet to be achieved in the other fields of interest? 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, we know in advance which is the end point that Hicks will finally 
reach at the conclusion of his five-year journey from 1935 to 1939: the finishing line is nothing but 
Value and Capital. Yet, since the interpretations of VC are still nowadays highly controversial, it 
may prove illuminating to try and understand how exactly Hicks arrives at his final destination 
(which is of course final only with respect to the 1930s). Moreover, even if at the beginning some of 
the final ingredients are already present in embryonic form, from a theoretical point of view the 
starting point is still very far from the end point. Hence, not only is the distance to be covered long, 
but also the questions to be answered are many and diverse: as a matter of fact, in order to fulfil his 
task, Hicks should be able to answer all the questions listed under the eight headings above. It 
should be clear, however, that not all the issues are tackled and solved by him at one and the same 
time; further, not all the solutions suggested over time are conclusive and immutable: as in the early 
1930s, so in the mid- and late 1930s too there are some afterthoughts and changes of mind, though 
in a lesser degree than before; finally, not all the solutions eventually arrived at are equally 
convincing: VC, after all, is only a step in Hicks’s intellectual history, albeit an important one. 
Before embarking upon a more detailed discussion of the individual issues, it is still convenient 
to distinguish the questions that are confronted in the period from mid-1934 to 1939, leaving some 
evidence of the progress made in published papers and documents, from the questions whose 
solution is disclosed only when VC is finally made available. 
The questions grouped under headings 2 and 3, that is, the questions concerning the 
equilibration issue, as well as the question under 8, that is, the question concerning the possible 
amalgamation of the various parts of Hicks’s theoretical endeavour, are left to be spelled out in VC. 
This does not mean, of course, that they are not jointly analysed with the others, but only that their 
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resolution requires the previous systematisation of the whole architecture of the theoretical system 
to be put forward in VC. The question under heading 1, as we shall see, is repeatedly confronted 
over the intervening years, and some traces are made public in the papers published in that period; 
but, also in this case, a full solution of the underlying methodological issue can only be provided 
when the picture is complete. 
The questions under the headings from 4 to 7, on the contrary, are systematically tackled over 
the five years from 1935 to 1939, and the advances progressively made find their way to the press. 
There are a few papers playing a crucial role in this regard: the first is a paper published in 1935 
with the title “Wages and Interest: The Dynamic Problem”, but soon relabelled by Hicks the 
‘Bread’ paper, in view of the assumed nature of the only consumer good supposed to be produced in 
the economy therein described; then there are two papers related with the appearance of Keynes’s 
General Theory, namely, the timely review of Keynes’s book, published in The Economic Journal 
in 1936, and the celebrated IS-LM paper, published in Econometrica in 1937. The focus of the 
‘Bread’ paper is formally on capital (under 7), but actually on the two alternative equilibrium 
notions (under 4 and 5). The focus of the two General Theory papers is on expectations (under 6) 
and the two alternative equilibrium notions (under 4 and 5). Finally, as already said, the grand 
methodological issue concerning the alternative between the Walrasian and the Marshallian 
tradition insinuates itself everywhere, but is not really solved before the appearance of VC. 
 
5. Value and Capital: The Long Gestation (1935-1939) 
 
Let us start from the ‘Bread’ paper (Hicks 1935b), whose central model is in many respects a 
small-scale anticipation of the VC temporary equilibrium model. However, it should be immediately 
added that, on top of the difference of scale, which is not irrelevant, there are many other 
dissimilarities between the two models that deserve mentioning. Money and all the monetary 
complications are essentially disregarded in the ‘Bread’ paper, except for a few hints in the last 
section. With the exception of this last section, the model discussed in the paper is a three-
commodity general equilibrium system, with two flow-commodities (labour services and Bread) 
and one asset (loans). All prices “are reckoned in terms of ‘Bread’. The rate of interest is a ‘bread’ 
rate of interest”. Capital, called Equipment, “is not exchangeable” (Hicks 1935b, p. 69)13 . 
In the ‘Walras’ paper, as will be recalled, Hicks had concluded that an amended version of 
Walras’s theory of capital, satisfying the stationarity assumption and an aggregate capital equation, 
presumably of the type suggested by J.B. Clark (1899) or Cassel (1932), would represent the best 
point of departure for economic dynamics. Yet, in the ‘Bread’ paper, Hicks’s stance on this issue is 
altogether different: quite evidently, the reasons underlying his previous support for a stationary 
equilibrium approach had been fading away in the meanwhile, and this had induced him to change 
his mind on the capital issue as well. 
To begin with, Hicks recalls that 
 
most modern capital theories fall into one of two classes. On the one hand, there is the 
‘timeless’ type of theory, which treats capital as a factor of production like any other. Such a 
theory is that of J.B. Clark. On the other hand, there is the ‘period of production’ theory of 
Böhm-Bawerk and Wicksell. [...] They are both stationary theories, built upon the 
hypothesis of a stationary state, quite satisfactory under that hypothesis, but incapable of 
extension to meet other hypotheses, and consequently incapable of application. In a 
                                                 
13 The non-exchangeability of existing Capital makes the model more similar to Walras’s original model with capital 
formation, where only newly produced capital goods are exchangeable, than to the VC model, where all capital goods 
are exchangeable. In this respect, the slightly earlier paper “A Suggestion for Simplifying the Theory of Money” (Hicks 
1935a), later nicknamed as the ‘Simplifying’ paper, comes closer to the spirit of the future VC model: for it paves to 
way to a full incorporation of money, bonds, and all sorts of assets into a general equilibrium framework of the type that 
will be discussed in detail in VC. 
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stationary state they are both correct. [...] But once we leave the stationary conditions, these 
convenient equalities disappear, and theories based on them cease to be applicable. (Hicks 
1935b, pp. 67-8) 
 
To this passage, the following somewhat cryptic sentence is appended: 
 
To found a theory upon an assumed equality, which is not a real equality, is a most 
dangerous thing to do [...]. (Hicks 1935b, p. 68) 
 
This sentence may be interpreted as asserting that, while the aggregate capital equation is 
assumed to satisfy an appropriate stationarity condition, depending on the specific approach 
followed, such stationarity condition is imposed from outside the model, rather than being the 
endogenous outcome of the individuals’ choices, as it should be in a consistent general equilibrium 
model. If this interpretation is correct, this is the first passage where Hicks proves to be aware that 
the stationarity assumption is illegitimate outside the model of a pure-flow economy. 
In any case, at the time when the ‘Bread’ paper was written, Hicks’s acknowledgement that the 
“hypothesis of a stationary state” has its “dangerous” sides proved instrumental in favouring his 
departure from the stationary equilibrium approach in capital theory. Besides that, a second 
important reason for abandoning the stationarity assumption was provided by the theoretical 
developments that had been taking place in Swedish economics since 1929, by virtue of the 
pioneering works of Lindahl, (1929) and (1930), and Myrdal (1932). Hicks had read Myrdal (1932) 
at the beginning of 1934, enthusiastically reviewing it in Economica (Hicks, 1934b)14. Moreover, in 
the summer of 1934 Hicks had had the opportunity to discuss directly with Lindahl his 1929 and 
1930 papers in Swedish, an experience that would repeat itself in 1935. 
Starting from Wicksell’s monetary theory and his analysis of the so-called “cumulative 
processes” (Wicksell 1898, and 1901-6, vol. 2), Lindahl had developed a method of analysis that 
would later become known as ‘period analysis’: the method, of which, as already recalled, Hicks 
had already made a rudimentary use in his 1933 paper, consists in subdividing time into a sequence 
of periods, in studying the equilibrium conditions of each individual period, and, possibly, in 
extending the analysis to the entire sequence. In his 1929 paper Lindahl, after critically discussing 
the stationarity assumption, had put forward two alternative models of instantaneous equilibrium, 
under the alternative assumptions of perfect and imperfect foresight, respectively. These 
equilibrium models had then been employed in the 1930 paper to discuss the Wicksellian problem 
of the “cumulative process”. Similarly Myrdal, after criticising the method of assuming a stationary 
state as the starting point of the analysis, had put forward, with many a proviso (Myrdal 1932, p. 
44), an instantaneous equilibrium model with given expectations, to be used as the foundation of his 
‘period analysis’. 
In the ‘Bread’ paper Hicks, after dropping the stationarity assumption, quite deliberately chose 
“to treat the continuous variable time as if it were discontinuous” (1935b, p. 68, fn. 2). In the paper 
the single periods into which time is subdivided are called “weeks”. The market is only open on the 
first day of the week, i.e., on Mondays. Perfect competition is assumed in all markets (for Bread, 
labour, and loans, respectively) and a competitive equilibrium is supposed to be reached on each 
Monday: at the equilibrium prices (wages and rate of interest), demand equals supply in each 
market. Walras’ Law is explicitly proved and exploited to allow the theorist, in determining the 
equilibrium conditions of the model, to get rid of one of the markets and of the corresponding 
market-clearing equation. Availing himself of this opportunity, in the ‘Bread’ paper Hicks chose to 
disregard the market for loans, therein identified with “that elusive thing, the ‘capital market’” 
(1935b, p. 77). 
                                                 
14 Myrdal’s essay, originally published in German in 1932, was translated into English and published a few years later 
under the title Monetary Equilibrium (Myrdal 1939). But, by that time, Hicks had long been acquainted with Myrdal’s 
work through the German version of his essay. 
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As can be seen, the inspiration of the model is clearly Walrasian. And yet, the choice to restrict 
the analysis to just three markets is certainly due to Hicks’s desire to combine Walrasian rigour with 
Marshallian concreteness. The model is in effect a macromodel with some Walrasian 
microfoundations: the device of assuming representative agents (one labourer, one entrepreneur, 
one rentier) is exploited, but the treatment is unsatisfactory. In fact, in the ‘Bread’ paper, Hicks 
contented himself with discussing the probable effects of changes in current and possibly expected 
prices on demands and supplies; but, in spite of Hicks’s assertion to the contrary (1935b, p. 78, fn. 
11), he was unable to reach any definite conclusion by means of his analysis, due to the insufficient 
specification of the model. In particular, a quite detailed discussion of the representative 
entrepreneur’s choices of intertemporal production plans under alternative assumptions about 
changes in prices and price expectations is actually developed in the paper. But, since the model is 
not really closed, all this discussion does not go beyond the casuistic analysis of the representative 
entrepreneur’s choices, without providing any explanation of market results15. 
As can be seen from the above account, the ‘Bread’ model anticipates many aspects of the VC 
temporary equilibrium model. In particular, in the 1935 paper one can already find the systematic 
use of ‘period analysis’, the distinction Monday-week, the assumption that a competitive Walrasian 
equilibrium is established on each Monday, the idea that the dynamics of the economy concerned 
can be described by means of a chronologically ordered sequence of equilibria associated with 
successive Mondays. Yet, at the end of the story, in assessing the results achieved by using the 
machinery of the model, Hicks is forced to acknowledge that the potential inherent in ‘period 
analysis’ has not been really exploited, particularly in so far as the dynamic aspect is concerned. For 
 
in all our investigations we have never got beyond our first Monday. There is no reason why 
theory should be becalmed at that point; [...] we ought to go on to see what happens on 
Monday week. However, time must go on in its own order, and Monday week will have to 
be another story. (1935b, p. 79) 
 
Hicks raises here the problem of the relationship between static analysis, which aims at 
determining the equilibrium prevailing on each Monday together with its properties, and dynamic 
analysis, which aims instead at stringing together all such equilibria in a sequence, whose properties 
ought then to be examined by means of a distinctive piece of theory. As far as the ‘Bread’ model is 
concerned, however, it is clear that the static part of the analysis tends to absorb all the energies of 
the researcher, killing the dynamic part before it can even start to do its job. A similar problem also 
arises in connection with the method of analysis adopted by Keynes in his General Theory. To 
better understand similarities and differences between the approach that Hicks was trying to build in 
the second half of the 1930s and the approach that Keynes was striving to work out at about the 
same time, let us now turn to an examination of Hicks’s reactions to the appearance of Keynes’s 
General Theory at the beginning of 1936. 
As is well-known, Hicks put forward his assessment of Keynes’s book on two different 
occasions: the first opportunity arose when Hicks was asked (by Keynes himself) to contribute a 
review-article to The Economic Journal immediately after the publication of the book (Hicks 
1936b); the second chance was instead offered by the presentation of the famous IS-LM paper at a 
meeting in Oxford in September 1936 (Hicks 1937a). While the 1937 article is of course of 
paramount importance for the future development of Keynesian economics, and of macroeconomics 
in general, the 1936 review is instead more relevant to the understanding of the impact of Keynes’s 
theory on Hicks’s own ideas and on the systematisation of those issues that were still open at the 
time in his methodological and theoretical stance. 
                                                 
15 The inadequate specification of the ‘Bread’ model can also help explain the contradictory results obtained by Hicks in 
using the same model to test some conclusions he had reached a few years before in The Theory of Wages (1932). On 
this, see also Hicks’s comments in (1982d). 
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The IS-LM article, as is well-known, is a reconstruction of a part of the analytical core of the 
General Theory along (loosely) Walrasian lines, a reconstruction that Hicks was able to provide in 
so short a time because he could exploit much of the work already done in view of his ‘Bread’ 
paper16. In the 1937 paper, the most evident influence of the Walrasian methodology, as employed 
in the ‘Bread’ paper, is represented by Hicks’s reliance on Walras’ Law in order to reduce the 
equilibrium conditions of a three-market macromodel (money, bonds, and goods) to a two-equation 
system or a two-dimensional diagram (the IS-LM diagram), thereby also getting rid at one stroke of 
the so-called “loanable funds” controversy. Keynes, who expressed overall appreciation about 
Hicks’s reconstruction, was unable to understand this point17, thereby confirming his distance from 
the analytics (though not from the broad perspective and general aims) of the Walrasian approach18. 
For the present purposes, however, it is the 1936 review to be the more relevant. Here Hicks 
starts by pointing out that the General Theory “is sometimes presented as a theory of ‘output in 
general’; sometimes as a theory of ‘shifting equilibrium’” (Hicks 1936b, p. 84). These features 
identify two of the most revolutionary traits of the General Theory from Hicks’s own point of view. 
As to the first point, Hicks’s remarks on the method of the General Theory are as follows: 
 
It is a theory of output in general vis-à-vis Marshall, who took into account many of the sort 
of complications which concern Mr Keynes, but took them into account only with reference 
to the single industry. [...] The technique of this work is, on the whole, conservative: more 
conservative than in the Treatise. It is the technique of Marshall, but it is applied to 
problems never tackled by Marshall and his contemporaries. (Hicks 1936b, pp. 85, 99) 
 
From Keynes’s bold generalisation of Marshall’s theory to a large body of issues that Marshall 
had disregarded, combined with his preservation of Marshall’s technique and pragmatic attitude, 
Hicks drew an encouragement to do the same with respect to Walras and, at the same time, to make 
a further effort to overcome the Marshall-Walras opposition. 
As to the second point, Hicks’s comments are as follows: 
 
It is a theory of shifting equilibrium vis-à-vis the static or stationary theories of general 
equilibrium, such as those of Ricardo, Böhm-Bawerk or Pareto. 
 
While the inclusion of Ricardo in the set of economists to rebuke is essentially due to Keynes’s 
definition of “classics”, the names of Böhm-Bawerk and Pareto allude instead to the sort of value 
and capital theory on which Hicks had been working over the previous few years. 
But then, in 1936, the novel approach admirably developed by Keynes in his General Theory 
provided Hicks with a further argument to add to the already remarkable list of reasons in favour of 
the abandonment of the stationarity assumption, an assumption which however continued to be 
fashionable among Cambridge economists19 and many other quarters: 
 
Ordinary (static) economic theory, so the old argument went, explains to us the working of 
the economic system in ‘normal’ conditions. Booms and slumps, however, are deviations 
from this norm, and are thus to be explained by some disturbing cause. [...] 
The present theory [i.e., Keynes’s General Theory] breaks away from the whole of this 
range of ideas. It is no longer allowed that ordinary economic theory can give a correct 
analysis of even normal conditions; the things it leaves out of account are too important. The 
                                                 
16 On the mixed origins and uncertain lineage of Hicks’s 1937 article, see Dimand (2007). However, on the alleged 
Walrasian parentage of the IS-LM model, see also Hicks’s much later comments in (1980a, p. 320). 
17 On this see the Keynes-Hicks exchange of correspondence in (Keynes 1973, pp. 79-83). 
18 On this see De Vroey (1999a, p. 122, fn. 14). 
19 See, e.g., Pigou’s 1935 book The Economics of Stationary States, reviewed by Hicks (1936a) at a time when he was 
also reviewing Keynes’s General Theory. 
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changing, progressing, fluctuating economy has to be studied on its own, and cannot 
usefully be referred to the norm of a static state. (Hicks 1936b, p. 85) 
 
One might suspect that dropping the “norm” may cause the theory to become indeterminate. 
Yet, this is not so, if Keynes’s most important innovation, “the method of expectations”, is 
accepted. For 
 
from the standpoint of pure theory, the use of the method of expectations is perhaps the most 
revolutionary thing about the book [...]. The point of the method is that it reintroduces 
determinateness into a process of change. (Hicks 1936b, pp. 86-7) 
 
According to Hicks, the method of expectations works as follows: 
 
If we assume given, not only the tastes and resources ordinarily assumed given in static 
theory, but also people’s anticipations of the future, it is possible to regard demands and 
supplies as determined by these tastes, resources and anticipations, and prices are 
determined by demands and supplies. Once the missing element – anticipations – is added, 
equilibrium analysis can be used, not only in the remote stationary conditions to which 
many economists have found themselves driven back, but even in the real world, even in the 
real world in ‘disequilibrium’. (Hicks 1936b, p. 86) 
 
This is a quite precise description of what would become, in a couple of years, the VC 
temporary equilibrium model, rather than of Keynes’s General Theory model. It is worth noting, 
however, that the embryonic VC model already detectable in Hicks’s 1936 review-article is 
presented as the outcome of Keynes’s most revolutionary innovation, the “method of expectations”. 
The use of Keynes’s method allows the theoretician to determine the equilibrium at a certain 
“date” (the “week” of the ‘Bread’ paper or, a few years later, of VC). There is of course the problem 
of stringing together the equilibria referring to successive “dates”: it is the problem of the so-called 
“continuation” theory, a problem to which Hicks would come back over and over again for the rest 
of his life (1956, pp. 223-5; 1963, p. 315; 1965, p. 65; 1976, p. 290; 1976, p. 290; 1985, pp. 69-70). 
In this respect, however, the stance taken by Hicks in 1936 is a very cautious one: 
 
It is, indeed, not impossible to say something about further effects; for we can deduce what 
the stocks of goods will be at the end of the period if the decisions are carried out, and this 
gives us a basis for the analysis of a second period. But it is probable that the change in 
actual production during the first period will influence the expectations ruling at the end of 
that period; and there is no means of telling what that influence will be. (Hicks 1935b, p. 87) 
 
The first part of this passage is purely Walrasian theory (after the adoption of the “hypothèse 
des bons”). But the second part alludes to a source of dynamic indeterminacy (the unpredictable 
influence of current performance on end-of-period expectations) that had certainly not been 
contemplated by Walras, given his tacit assumption of stationary (or static, as they are currently 
called) expectations. 
 
 
6. Hicks’s Temporary Equilibrium Model: Walras Retrouvé? 
 
As we have seen in the previous Section, during the long period of gestation of VC Hicks 
confronted most of the issues that had been left unsettled at the end of 1934, achieving some 
provisional results that, immediately made available through publication in scientific journals, 
would eventually be systematized and incorporated in VC. Yet, two important fields to which Hicks 
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had devoted much of his time and effort in the early 1930s, the field of consumer and producer 
choice and the equilibration issue, remained essentially frozen during the VC gestation period: 
Hicks was evidently working on these themes as well20, but he was waiting for the appropriate 
framework where to fit his results. That framework was finally provided by Value and Capital. 
As regards the theory of individual choice, as well as the related theories of demand and 
production, Hicks’s chief problem in the mid-1930s was to find a way to coordinate the results 
achieved in this area in the first half of the 1930s with the results already obtained or hopefully to 
be obtained in other fields, such as the theory of money and capital, traditionally unrelated with the 
previous ones21. The opportunity to systematize all these apparently disparate subjects was offered 
by the process of writing up Value and Capital. In outlining the overall design of the book, Hicks 
took two related methodological steps that, independently of their intrinsic validity, which is indeed 
questionable and has in effect been repeatedly questioned over time, allowed him to cope with his 
still unsettled questions. 
The first of the two steps consisted in sharply dividing Statics from Dynamics. At the very 
beginning of the dynamic part of VC, Hicks put forward the following blunt definitions: 
 
I call Economic Statics those parts of economic theory where we do not trouble about 
dating; Economic Dynamics those parts where every quantity must be dated. (Hicks 1939, p. 
115) 
 
The second step consisted in remorselessly subdividing the subject matter of economics into 
two neatly separate parts, each of which was then allocated to Statics or Dynamics, apparently with 
no overlapping between the two. To Statics Hicks allocated all of traditional choice, demand and 
production theory, that is, all those issues on which he had been working in the early 1930s, 
obtaining the results at first collected in his 1932 book and in the joint 1934 paper with Allen, and 
later summarised in the 1937 book in French. All the remaining parts of economics, instead, were 
allocated to Dynamics. 
By taking a closer look at the static part of VC, however, one realizes that, apart from individual 
choice theory (both producer and consumer), also an important portion of market equilibrium theory 
is included in Statics. Yet, since in Statics no quantity is dated, all activities that are essentially 
related with time must be excluded from it. Therefore,  
 
[Statics] abstracts from capital and interest, saving and investment, and all that complex of 
activities which, in an earlier chapter, I called ‘Speculation’. (Hicks 1939, p. 100) 
 
To this list of excluded activities, which appears towards the end of the static part of VC, a 
further list is added at the beginning of the dynamic part, which includes “trade fluctuations” and 
“money” (1939, p. 116). What remains after all these exclusions essentially coincides with the 
activities allowed for in the consistent models of stationary equilibrium discussed in the previous 
Sections of the present paper, that is, all the activities and only those activities that are permitted to 
take place in a pure-flow economy. 
So, in the end, a statical equilibrium model, in the VC sense, is nothing but a consistent 
stationary equilibrium model of a pure-flow economy, where, in accordance with Hicks’s 
conventions and definitions, all the variables have been deprived of any time dimension. In the 
                                                 
20 As far as the field of consumer and producer choice is concerned, a significant trace of Hicks’s ongoing process of 
revision and development of the ideas originally put forward in the first half of the 1930s can be found in the book 
Théorie mathématique de la valeur, published in French in 1937 (Hicks 1937b), which somewhat anticipates the static 
part of VC. 
21 What we chiefly have in mind are the results reached by Hicks in his two 1935 papers: the ‘Simplifying’ paper, on the 
theory of money and portfolio choice (Hicks 1935a), and the ‘Bread’ paper, on the theory of capital, interest, prices, and 
price-expectations (Hicks 1935b). 
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traditional stationary equilibrium models of the consistent variety (such as Walras’s exchange and 
production model in the second and third editions of the Eléments, Wicksell’s model of a-
capitalistic production, or the so-called Walras-Cassel production model) all the variables used to 
have a time dimension; yet, since the models belonging to this class can only deal with pure flows, 
all the variables were in effect referred to the same time period. The time dimension used to play a 
role in traditional stationary equilibrium models because those models were typically associated 
with an equilibration process, which requires the variables to be dated. According to the new 
distinction between Statics and Dynamics proposed by Hicks in VC, however, the analysis of the 
equilibration process becomes one of the issues to be studied by Economic Dynamics. Hence a 
consistent stationary equilibrium model of a pure-flow economy can be legitimately transformed 
into a timeless static model in the sense of Hicks. 
Yet, even if a Hicksian static model is timeless, there are two ways of dating its variables which 
leave the formal structure of the model unaffected. If all the variables are assigned the same date, 
we obtain the model of a ‘Spot Economy’, that is, an economy where all transactions are for 
immediate delivery. On the contrary, a model where all variables are dated, but the dates are not all 
the same, can be interpreted as a ‘Futures Economy’, where markets are currently open for all 
present and future dates (Hicks 1939, p. 136). The ‘Spot Economy’ and the ‘Futures Economy’ are 
extreme cases of some theoretical interest22. They are dynamic models, according to Hicks’s 
definitions of Statics and Dynamics, since in such models the variables are dated. But the very fact 
that such models are formally identical with a static model makes it apparent that Hicks’s 
definitions in VC are not as clear-cut as he probably had expected or hoped for. 
As we have seen, the analysis of the equilibration process, traditionally regarded (by Hicks 
himself before VC) as belonging to Statics, becomes a part of Dynamics in the VC theoretical 
framework: this is unavoidable, in the light of Hicks’s new definitions, since “the adjustments 
needed to bring about equilibrium take time” (Hicks 1939, p. 116). So, let us now proceed to 
Dynamics, specifically to the second big issue still in need of clarification, namely, the equilibration 
issue. 
In the ‘Walras’ paper, as we have seen in Sections 2 and 3 above, Hicks had eventually 
identified four alternative equilibration mechanisms through which market equilibrium can be 
supposed to be established: three of these mechanisms can be shown to be consistent with both the 
logic of general equilibrium theory and the determinacy requirement, while the fourth is not. Let us 
recall the main results. The inconsistent mechanism is best exemplified by the equilibration device 
that would be at work in a Walrasian exchange model where the “no trade out of equilibrium 
assumption” were not to hold. Of the three consistent processes, the first is instanced by the 
Walrasian virtual tâtonnement process in ‘logical’ time or, for that matter, by the similarly 
interpreted Edgeworth recontracting process; both processes are supposed to drive the economy 
towards an instantaneous equilibrium. The second is exemplified by the Walrasian observable 
tâtonnement process in ‘real’ time taking place in a pure-flow stationary economy or, for that 
matter, by the similarly interpreted Edgeworthian recontracting process; both processes are 
supposed to drive the pure-flow economy towards a stationary equilibrium. Finally, the third is 
represented by Marshall’s observable equilibration process in ‘real’ time, as applied to a barter 
system or to the daily market for a consumer good or service under suitable assumptions about the 
traders’ utility functions; this process would drive the system or the market towards a final 
equilibrium which is determinate, as far as the rate of exchange between the two commodities or the 
money price of the consumer good or service are concerned. 
Now, according to Hicks (1939), of the three consistent mechanisms the first, namely, the 
Walras-Edgeworth virtual mechanism implying that equilibrium is actually reached before any 
                                                 
22 Disguised under the mask of Hicks’s ‘Spot Economy’ one can easily detect the old pure-flow economy traditionally 
analysed by the stationary equilibrium approach of the consistent variety. On the contrary, Hicks’s ‘Futures Economy’ 
can legitimately be regarded as a forerunner of the so-called complete-market, Arrow-Debreu economy, at least when 
the latter is interpreted in the way suggested by Debreu (1959). 
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observable activities are allowed to take place, concretely applies to “highly exceptional” markets 
only. Hence Walras’s and Edgeworth’s virtual “solution (if it may be called one) [is] not very 
convincing” and must be put aside (Hicks 1939, p. 128). So one is left with the remaining two 
processes: the equilibration process under stationary conditions, which is called the “method of the 
Austrians” in VC, and the “method of Marshall” (Hicks 1939, p. 117). 
Let us consider the first “method” first. As already explained, stationary equilibration processes 
of the consistent variety apply only to pure-flow economies. Yet, at the time of writing VC, Hicks 
was well-aware that the economists who had embraced the stationarity assumption over the 
previous decades – not only the Austrians, who for Hicks (1939, p. 117, fn. 1) were essentially 
Böhm-Bawerk and Wicksell, but also many others, among whom J.B. Clark, Cassel and Pigou are 
explicitly mentioned in this connection – had tried to use, and effectively used, this “method” to 
deal with capital as well. 
Now, in the case of J.B. Clark and Cassel, their endeavour had led, according to Hicks, to “great 
errors” (p. 116, fn. 1). As to the Austrians, in VC Hicks is not so explicit, contenting himself with 
saying that the stationary-state approach had had “a baneful influence on the minds of economists”, 
encouraging the neglect of all those time-related phenomena that are “supremely important” in 
economic dynamics (Hicks 1939, p. 119). Yet, it is precisely the very last paragraph of VC to dispel 
any possible doubt as to Hicks’s ultimate opinion, in 1939, about the stationary-state approach: 
 
We began our study of dynamic economics by rejecting the concept of a stationary state as 
an analytical tool. We rejected it then, because it seemed to be no more than a special case, 
which offered no facility for generalization. We have come in the end to doubt whether it is 
even conceivable as a special case [...]. (Hicks 1939, p. 302) 
 
So, in the end, Hicks is only left with 
 
the method of Marshall; though since, in the relevant part of Marshall’s work, [...] he is 
concerned with the determination of the value of one commodity only, considered as much 
as possible in isolation, while we are concerned with the determination of the whole system 
of values, we cannot follow him in all respects. (Hicks 1939, pp. 119-20) 
 
In view of the above exclusions and qualifications, therefore, as far as the equilibration issue is 
concerned, Hicks’s stated aim in VC turns out to be the following: to extend Marshall’s “method” to 
a multi-market setting, amending it as required by the larger context to which it is meant to apply. 
Yet, in spite of Hicks’s claims, it can be easily shown that, in generalizing Marshall’s “framework, 
so that it can be used for the discussion of the problems of a whole economic system” (1939, p. 
122), Hicks ends up by jettisoning most of Marshall’s conceptual framework. 
As is well-known, in Book V of his Principles, Marshall had adopted a tripartite classification 
of time periods according to their ‘length’ (Day, Short Period, Long Period), to which a similar 
classification of equilibrium concepts was associated (temporary or market-day equilibrium, short-
run normal equilibrium, long-run normal equilibrium). In Marshall’s temporary equilibrium model 
the problem at issue was to study the exchange process involving a given stock of a certain 
commodity during a specified day; in the two normal equilibrium models, instead, Marshall’s 
problem was to study the functioning of an “ongoing market”, extending over a “short” or “long” 
sequence of days, in each of which a flow of a certain commodity was supposed to be produced and 
exchanged under unvarying market conditions (more or less restrictively specified according to the 
‘length’ of the period). 
According to Hicks (1939, p. 122), “these categories are suitable enough for Marshall’s isolated 
market, but they hardly fit the analysis of the whole system”. Hence, in VC, Marshall’s Short Period 
and Long Period were dropped without any qualms, together with the associated normal equilibrium 
concepts – concepts that many economists, no doubt including Marshall himself, would have 
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regarded as the most characteristic concepts in the Marshallian system. After such unceremonious 
cuts, of Marshall’s original tripartite classification only the Day and the associated temporary 
equilibrium concept were provisionally able to survive. 
But this is not all. For, unlike Marshall, Hicks also wanted production to be allowed to take 
place during the Day in his VC temporary equilibrium model. In view of this, Hicks eventually 
decided to change the name of his shortest period, calling it “a Week, to distinguish it from 
Marshall’s Day” (1939, p. 122)23. However, the Week was not to remain, after all, the shortest 
indivisible period in VC: for Hicks also assumed that markets could open and contracts be made 
only in the first day of the week; so that, for the purposes of bargaining, making contracts, and 
setting prices, as opposed to the mere carrying out of economic activities already fixed up in 
previously settled contracts, it was Monday to become the shortest unit period in VC. 
Now, according to Hicks (1939, p. 120), in his temporary equilibrium model Marshall had put 
forward an “ingenious argument” by means of which, in spite of the equilibration process 
proceeding by trial and error, through bilateral exchanges taking place at prices different from the 
temporary equilibrium one, he had been able to show that the price at which the market would 
finish up at the end of the Day, that is, the temporary equilibrium price, was all the same perfectly 
determinate. In VC Hicks, after labelling as ‘false’ prices those prices (or, better, rates of exchange), 
that are implicit in the transactions carried out during a Marshallian equilibration process before the 
final equilibrium price is attained, suggested that Marshall’s “ingenious argument” could survive 
basically unaltered in a general equilibrium framework (1939, pp. 120, 128). And then, in a  Note 
on the “Formation of Prices” appended to Chapter IX of VC, the first chapter of the dynamic part of 
that book, he set out to prove his claim or, better, his conjecture (1939, pp. 127-9). 
We shall come back to this in a while. For the time being, if we provisionally take for granted, 
for the discussion’s sake, that Marshall’s argument actually generalizes to “a whole economic 
system”, we can conclude that all markets smoothly proceed by trail and error, by “higgling and 
bargaining”, as Marshall used to say, through transactions at ‘false’ prices, to a determinate 
equilibrium position on each given Monday, a position which remains thereafter unaltered over the 
following week. The data of the economy, including the agents’ expectations, change at the 
junctures between successive weeks, for both endogenous and exogenous reasons. The evolution of 
the economy over time, namely, its dynamics, can be described by means of a chronologically 
ordered sequence of temporary equilibria. 
As can be immediately verified, the time structure of Hicks’s temporary equilibrium model is 
tremendously similar to the time structure of Walras’s general equilibrium theory after the adoption 
of the “hypothèse des bons”, as stated in the passage of the fourth edition of the Eléments quoted at 
the beginning of Section 3 above: in fact, the equilibration process supposed to take place during 
Walras’s “phase des tâtonnements préliminaires” is similar to the equilibration process occurring 
during the market hours on Hicks’s ‘Monday’; Walras’s “phase statique” is analogous to Hicks’s 
‘week’; finally, Hicks’s change in the data at the juncture between successive weeks reminds us of 
Walras’s “phase dynamique” of trouble and change in the data at the end of each “phase statique”. 
The similarity between the two approaches stands out even more clearly if one considers the 
following passage by Hicks (1939, p. 127): 
 
By using the week, we become able to treat a process of change as consisting of a series of 
temporary equilibria; this enables us still to use equilibrium analysis in the dynamic field. 
 
In reading this sentence, the following question spontaneously arises: Which is the difference, if 
any, between Hicks’s temporary equilibrium method, as described above, and Pareto’s “method of 
successive equilibria” or Walras’s method of “mobile equilibrium”? 
                                                 
23 As will be recalled, the “week” had already made its appearance in (Hicks, 1935b) and, much before, in Berry (1891). 
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At first sight, the difference might appear to be flimsy or altogether inexistent. And yet, in 1934, 
Hicks had qualified as “rather pathetic” the passage by Walras, referred to above, on the time 
structure of the analysis after the adoption of the “hypothèse des bons”. In the attempt to find some 
justification for Hicks’s puzzling behaviour, one is led to look at the relevant passages more closely. 
At a closer inspection, the chief point of difference between the two approaches appears to be 
the following: in Hicks’s VC model the equilibration process underlying the temporary equilibrium 
concept is conceived as a ‘real’ time, observable disequilibrium process, in the spirit of Marshall’s 
“higgling and bargaining” of the market, whereas in the fourth edition of Walras’s Eléments the 
equilibration process supporting the Walrasian equilibrium concept (after the adoption of the 
“hypothèse des bons”) is explicitly viewed as an unobservable process in ‘logical’ time. After all, 
this is precisely the point that Hicks himself decided to stress when, after explaining why he could 
“not employ Marshall’s tripartite classification” as such in the VC model, he immediately added 
that he would nevertheless endeavour “to keep the truth it embodies (the time taken in adjustment) 
clearly in mind” (1939, p. 122). 
In view of this, it now becomes important to answer the question that has been raised and 
immediately postponed above: Is Hicks’s generalization of Marshall’s “ingenious argument” really 
legitimate? The way in which this question is answered will allow us to reach a definite conclusion 
on whether or not there exist any significant difference, at least as far as the equilibration process 
and the time structure of the analysis are concerned, between Walras’s instantaneous equilibrium 
concept in the fourth edition of the Eléments and Hicks’s temporary equilibrium concept in VC. 
Hicks’s argument in the Note on “The Formation of Prices” appended to Chapter IX of VC runs 
as follows. In Marshall’s partial equilibrium analysis, trading at ‘false’ prices gives rise to income 
effects, which are then sterilised by Marshall’s assumption about the constancy of the marginal 
utility of money24; the latter assumption, in turn, can be empirically justified for all commodities on 
which the consumer’s expenditure is small with respect to his total income. Hicks then proceeds as 
follows: 
 
It remains true in the general case, just as in Marshall’s special case, that gains and losses 
due to false trading only give rise to income effects – effects, that is, which are the same in 
kind as the income effects which may have to be considered even when we suppose 
equilibrium prices to be fixed straight away. (Hicks 1939, p. 129) 
 
Now, so Hicks’s argument proceeds, in standard static theory of the type discussed in the first 
part of VC, 
 
[we] have seen again and again that a certain degree of indeterminateness is nearly always 
imparted by income effects to the laws of economic theory. All that happens as a result of false 
trading is that this indeterminateness is somewhat intensified. (Hicks 1939, p. 129) 
 
But static theory has long since got accustomed to the sort of indeterminacy brought about by 
income effects and, by the end of the 1930s, it is well prepared to deal with it: the analysis of static 
equilibrium is by no means impaired by the recognition of the existence of income effects. “Just as 
in statics”, therefore, also in the analysis of the equilibration process we may expect that trading at 
‘false’ prices, with its ensuing income effects, ought not to disturb the quick convergence to a 
determinate equilibrium, particularly since “we may reasonably suppose that the transactions which 
take place at ‘very false’ prices are limited in volume”. (Hicks 1939, p. 129) 
As can be seen, the very conclusion eventually reached by Hicks is very weak in itself, for no 
robust theoretical argument would concede that the convergence to a determinate equilibrium 
ultimately depends on the “supposition”, however “reasonable” it may be, “that the transactions 
                                                 
24 See above, Section 2, particularly fn. 8. 
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which take place at ‘very false’ prices are limited in volume”. Yet, this is not the most disturbing 
aspect of Hicks’s overall argument: for much more troubling is the fact that not only are the 
premises on which Hicks’s conclusion rests shaky, but also the alleged ‘proof’ of the desired result 
is faulty. 
To see this, let us start by explaining how the idea of ‘generalising’ Marshall’s “ingenious 
argument” to a general equilibrium setting ought to be interpreted. First of all, it should be noted 
that, if one were willing to confine one’s attention to a pure-exchange economy and to assume that 
all the traders participating in such economy are characterised by additively separable utility 
functions which are quasi-linear in money (or a money commodity), then no formal ‘generalisation’ 
of Marshall’s temporary equilibrium model would in effect be required in order to make it 
applicable to a multi-market economy: for, in such a case, Marshall’s assumptions, by themselves,  
would be enough to provide a fairly ‘general’ theory of the functioning of all the markets existing in 
the economy, however numerous they might be. It would of course be true that, under such 
conditions, with no need to make any special ceteris paribus assumption, the functioning of each 
individual market, on which one individual consumer good is traded for money, might or even 
should be studied in isolation, all income effects would be cancelled, and finally - what is hardly 
mentioned in this context - all inter-commodity substitution effects would disappear too. But the 
economy would still remain a multi-market economy, if it were so from the beginning. 
Hence, when Hicks thinks of a possible ‘generalisation’ of the arguments employed by Marshall 
in his temporary equilibrium model, he is not simply suggesting to extend the analysis to a multi-
commodity economy, but he wants the proposed extension to apply to an economy characterised by 
truly interconnected markets, where income and inter-commodity substitution effects are allowed to 
occur and production is permitted to take place. In order to reach this goal, therefore, Hicks drops 
Marshall’s assumption of additively separable and quasi-linear (in money) utility functions, refrains 
from making any special ceteris paribus assumption, and studies the effects of out-of-equilibrium 
transactions (“false trading”) on the working of a multi-commodity economy with interconnected 
markets - which, however, is tacitly assumed to simply be a pure-exchange economy in the Note on 
“The Formation of Prices”. 
This is Hicks’s “general case”, with reference to which he makes essentially three statements: 1) 
“that gains and losses due to false trading only give rise to income effects”; 2) that these “income 
effects [...] are the same in kind as the income effects which may have to be considered even when 
we suppose equilibrium prices to be fixed straight away”, i.e., the same in kind as those arising in 
static analysis; 3) that “[a]ll that happens as a result of false trading is that [the] indeterminateness 
[already due to static income effects] is somewhat intensified”. But, while the first statement is at 
best grossly misleading, the second and the third are positively wrong. 
As to the first statement, one should consider that, in Marshall’s temporary equilibrium model, 
when each individual market can be examined in isolation, the income effects arising from trading 
at ‘false’ prices are indeed sterilised, due to the constant marginal utility of money assumption; but 
the determinacy of both the temporary equilibrium price and the quantity traded of the commodity 
concerned, as well as its independence of the path followed by the sequence of ‘false’ prices 
obtaining over the equilibration process, do not simply depend on assuming away all income 
effects, but also on the fact that, in Marshall’s temporary equilibrium model of an individual 
market, demand and supply functions can be unambiguously defined, together with the limits within 
which ‘false’ prices can range over the equilibration process, on the only knowledge of the traders’ 
utility functions, without any assumption whatsoever of price-taking behaviour on the part of the 
traders being either necessary or possible25. When we come to Hicks’s “general case”, however, and 
allow for the possible occurrence of actual transactions out of equilibrium, we are completely at a 
loss, for we are unable to specify not only the ‘false’ prices at which the transactions might take 
place, but also the ‘false’ amounts of the commodities that might be actually traded: Marshall’s 
                                                 
25 On this, see Donzelli (2008, Section 4). 
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theory cannot be of any help, here, due to the assumed generality of the utility functions and the 
ensuing interconnectedness of markets; but Walras’s theory cannot be of any avail, too, for 
Walrasian demand and supply functions can only allow the theorists to predict desired transactions 
at prices taken as given by the traders, being completely powerless when it comes to predict actual 
transactions occurring at otherwise unspecified and unspecifiable ‘false’ prices26. Reducing all this 
mess to the fact “that gains and losses due to false trading only give rise to income effects”, as 
Hicks appears to suggest, is misleading, to say the least. 
In the last analysis, Hicks’s confusion in this respect can probably be traced to his unwarranted 
belief, documented in Section 2 above, that Marshall’s idea of competition and competitive 
behaviour is after all very similar to Walras’s idea of competition and price-taking behaviour, what 
is certainly not true. In the small world of Marshall’s temporary equilibrium model, observable and 
irreversible disequilibrium behaviour can be allowed for, without hampering in the least the 
determinateness of the final equilibrium (as far as price and quantity traded of the commodity under 
investigation are concerned). On the contrary, in the large world of interconnected markets 
characteristic of both Walras’s general equilibrium theory and Hicks’s VC temporary equilibrium 
model, allowing for observable and irreversible disequilibrium behaviour would cause the whole 
theoretical structure to fall to pieces, due to the occurrence of transactions on which the theory has 
nothing to say, so that no prediction could be made concerning the transactions actually taking 
place, or the path possibly traced over time by the trading process, or, finally, the ultimate outcome 
(if any) of the process. 
Having discussed at length the ambiguities surrounding Hicks’s first statement concerning the 
possible extension of Marshall’s “ingenious argument” to Hicks’s “general case”, it is now easy to 
explain why Hicks’s second and third statements are mistaken. The income effects studied by 
standard static theory have to do with the effects of notional changes in relative prices on Walrasian 
individual, hence aggregate, demands of price-taking consumers. All these effects are perfectly 
determinate from a theoretical point of view, provided that consumers’ utility functions are 
specified. What is a priori uncertain is the sign of the income effect; but such uncertainty can be 
immediately dispelled, as soon as consumers’ preferences are known. Similarly, the 
“indeterminateness [...] imparted by income effects to the laws of economic theory”, e.g., to the 
uncompensated law of demand, is really such only a priori: for, if the appropriate data were known, 
no indeterminateness would be left. Altogether different is the nature of the income effects caused 
by ‘false trading’, as well as the indeterminateness to which they give rise. Such effects have 
nothing to do with notional changes in relative prices: they are simply part (perhaps, the smallest 
part) of the disruptive effects produced on the functioning of a system of truly interdependent 
markets by the actual carrying out of disequilibrium trades. Since no theory is available to explain 
such effects, they must remain obscure, even if the (Walrasian) data of the economy were perfectly 
known. For the same reason, the indeterminateness they impart to the laws of economic theory, 
specifically to the laws of equilibrium establishment, is not bound to disappear, whatever amount of 
(Walrasian) data might be at hand. What is missing is not the data, rather the theory explaining what 
might occur out of equilibrium. 
To sum up on the equilibration issue, Hicks’s attempt at making his approach more ‘realistic’ in 
a Marshallian spirit ends up in a complete failure. In the ‘Walras’ paper (1934), as recalled above, 
Hicks had doubted of the possibility of generalising the Marshallian equilibration mechanism to a 
multi-market context; five years later, in Value and Capital, he eventually persuaded himself not 
only that there is a way in which such a generalisation can be carried out and made acceptable, but 
also that he had been able to discover that way; but unfortunately his conjecture was wrong. So that, 
in the end, if one were asked by which sort of equilibration process Hicks’s temporary equilibrium 
concept can be supported, one ought to conclude that any such process could not significantly differ 
                                                 
26 Many years after VC, Hicks himself (1965, p. 77) would appear to recognise that “[i]f we abandon the demand-supply 
equation, [we do] not  have any way of determining prices. [...] The determination of prices is taken right outside the 
model.”  
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from the virtual process in ‘logical’ time, advocated by Walras in the fourth edition of the Eléments 
to support his instantaneous equilibrium concept. Hicks himself, as we shall see in a moment, came 
very close to admitting this in VC. 
We have now reached a point where we can draw some conclusions as to the relationship 
between the VC temporary equilibrium model, the final upshot of the winding path followed by 
Hicks’s system of thought over the 1930s, and the Walrasian and Paretian tradition of the previous 
decades. 
Over the 1930s, as has been seen, Hicks had been able to make important progress over Walras 
and Pareto in a number of diverse fields, bringing about theoretical innovations and analytical 
improvements that caused general equilibrium theory at the end of the 1930s to be something 
altogether different from what it had been at the beginning. Apart from achieving remarkable results 
in the theory of choice and equilibrium strictly speaking, Hicks had made advances in the more 
specialised fields of uncertainty, money and financial assets, expectations, intertemporal relations 
and planning, indirectly contributing, in this way, to the theory of capital too. 
All these results were incorporated into the VC temporary equilibrium model, which is therefore 
by far richer than Walras’s original model in all these respects. In particular, the following two 
points should be stressed: 1) while in his VC temporary equilibrium model Hicks made a very 
conscious use of generalised competitive point expectation functions, making expectations of future 
prices depend on current (and occasionally past) prices according to functions that can in principle 
take any analytical form, Walras had only tacitly introduced stationary price expectations into his 
analysis, making of them quite a parsimonious use; 2) while in his VC temporary equilibrium model 
Hicks systematically employed the notion of intertemporal plan, thereby making it possible to 
distinguish between equilibrium at a point of time and equilibrium over time and paving the way for 
the possible discussion of intertemporal disequilibrium, Walras had confined his attention to 
currently open markets only, thereby telescoping all future planning into the agents’ current choices 
among currently available capital goods. 
All these differences are no doubt very significant. And yet, as regards the interpretation of both 
the equilibration process and the equilibrium concept stricto sensu, there are no major distinctions 
to be drawn between the results eventually arrived at by Walras in 1900, after a quarter of a century 
of revisions and amendments, and those reached by Hicks in 1939, after ten years of reflections and 
turnabouts: in both cases the equilibration process is essentially virtual and the equilibrium concept 
is “essentially instantaneous”27. The only difference is that, in Hicks’s case, the virtual character of 
the process and the instantaneous nature of the equilibrium concept are disguised under a mask of 
superficial Marshallianism, with all its pretended, but apparently reassuring, insistence on the “time 
taken in adjustment”, as well as on the alleged observability and irreversibility of disequilibrium 
behaviour. 
Hicks himself, on the other hand, seemed occasionally to be aware, already in 1939, of the true 
nature of his constructs and of the real implications of his assumptions. In fact, at the beginning of 
Chapter X of VC, less than two pages after that Note on “The Formation of Prices” that had been 
designed precisely to account for the time-consuming, observable disequilibrium process that ought 
to precede the establishment of the temporary equilibrium on any given Monday, we can find the 
following, disarming statement: 
 
                                                 
27 In the Additional Note C, a Note on “Professor Samuelson’s Dynamic Theory” appended to the second edition of 
Value and Capital, which was published seven years after the first (Hicks 1946, p. 337), Hicks decided to use exactly 
the expression “essentially instantaneous” to describe the nature of the process of adjustment underlying the temporary 
equilibrium concept employed in the first edition of VC. This should be compared with the expression used by Hicks in 
the first edition of his Theory of Wages (1932), where the equilibration processes are said to be “by no means 
instantaneous”. On this see also De Vroey (1999b, p. 38). 
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Since we shall not pay much attention to the process of equilibration which must precede the 
formation of the equilibrium prices, our method seems to imply that we conceive of the 
economic system as being always in equilibrium. (Hicks 1939, p. 131) 
 
In the years and decades following the publication of Value and Capital, Hicks’s awareness of 
the ultimate implications of the temporary equilibrium method, which is only embryonic in 1939, 
grew stronger and stronger, leading him eventually to disavow it: 
 
The fundamental weakness of the Temporary Equilibrium method is the assumption, which 
it is obliged to make, that the market is in equilibrium – actual demand equals desired 
demand, actual supply equals desired supply – even in the very short period, which is what 
its single period must be taken to be. This assumption comes down from Marshall, but even 
in a very competitive economy, such very short-run equilibration is hard to swallow [...]. 
(Hicks 1965, p. 76) 
 
And yet, even in 1965, at a time when Hicks was fully prepared to repudiate his foremost 
intellectual offspring of the 1930s, the Temporary Equilibrium method, he was not yet ready to 
disown the alleged Marshallian parentage of the VC temporary equilibrium model, as can be seen 
from the above-quoted passage. Nor was he willing to give up the comforting fiction of a ‘real’ time 
equilibration process where observable disequilibrium transactions take place at ‘false’ prices, as 
can be inferred from the following passage, where the structure of the VC temporary equilibrium 
model is being once again reconsidered: 
 
Monday’s trading proceeds until prices are established that equate demands and supplies, for 
goods and services to be delivered during the ‘week’. It is not supposed that equilibrium 
prices are established at once; there may be a good deal of ‘false’ trading before they are 
established. (Hicks 1965, p. 66) 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
After many explorations in different directions during the early 1930s, Hicks ended up in 1934 
by advocating an interpretation of Walras’s equilibrium and capital theory along stationary lines, an 
interpretation that does not correspond to the view endorsed by the last Walras and by Pareto. This 
was due, in part, to the influence of the scientific environment surrounding Hicks in the years of his 
formation and, for another part, to Walras’s sheer confusion and Pareto’s excessive conciseness and 
insufficient analysis. But it also revealed the existence of inner difficulties in the general 
equilibrium approach, particularly as far as the equilibration process is concerned. 
In the following years, however, Hicks embarked upon a systematic revision of his inherited or 
acquired ideas in a number of fields, first of all in the general theoretical field of equilibrium and 
equilibration, a revision that followed a path very similar to that covered by Walras himself in the 
last quarter of the Nineteenth century. In the second half of the 1930s, during the long gestation of 
Value and Capital, Hicks’s ideas on equilibrium and capital progressively changed and matured, to 
eventually culminate, with the publication of VC in 1939, in the rediscovery of a method of analysis 
and an equilibrium concept, Hicks’s temporary equilibrium, that are substantially similar to the 
method of analysis and equilibrium concept (“mobile equilibrium” and “method of successive 
equilibria”) put forward by the last Walras and by Pareto. 
Yet this direct link with the Walrasian tradition was not overtly recognised by Hicks in VC. In 
particular, the essentially Walrasian character of the equilibration process supporting Hicks’s 
temporary equilibrium concept was carefully disguised under Marshallian garments in Hicks’s 1939 
great book. This fact delayed Hicks’s own recognition of the limits of the VC approach, which 
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would start to be cautiously questioned by him only in 1956 and, more openly, since 196528. Yet, in 
view of the enormous diffusion of VC and the centrality of its role in the development of the neo-
Walrasian programme, Hicks’s ambiguities as to the ascendance of VC have also had two less 
private consequences. 
From a historiographical point of view, Hicks’s ambiguities have concurred to spread the legend 
that the VC temporary equilibrium concept was an entirely new concept, essentially due to Hicks 
himself and a few other economists at work in the late 1920s and in the early and mid-1930s. It was 
only since the late 1970s, with the works of Diewert (1977) and Morishima (1977), later followed 
by Witteloostuijn and Maks, (1988) and (1990), and others, that the origin of the concept was 
eventually traced back to Walras. 
From a theoretical point of view, a fuller awareness of the tormented history of the temporary 
equilibrium concept, and of the reasons explaining such a winding path from Walras’s time 
onwards, would have helped to build the neo-Walrasian programme on partially different and 
perhaps sounder foundations. 
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